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ARTICLES
MAKING MARKETS:
NETWORK EFFECTS AND THE
ROLE OF LAW IN THE CREATION OF
STRONG SECURITIES MARKETS
ROBERT B. AHDIEH*

As Russia and other formerly socialist states construct market
economies, the appearance of strong securities markets remains an
unfulfilled expectation. Notwithstanding broad privatization of stateowned enterprises and the elimination of industrial subsidies-essential
precursors to demand for capital-raising securities markets-stock markets
in Central and Eastern Europe remain illiquid, inefficient, and unreliable.
Strong securities markets do not, it seems, neatly follow from the
welfare-maximizing behavior of individuals and institutions. Nor can the
appearance of securities markets be effectively dictated by government
decree. Post-communist securities market transition therefore presents a
puzzle: Do markets emerge, or must they be created?
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DEMOCRACY (1996), and of my early interest in securities markets and regulation in Russia.
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Joining the debate over whether "law matters" in the creation of
securities markets, this Article draws on recent finance and microeconomic
analysis of network effects to propose an alternative theory of why law
might matter in the creation of securities markets, and to challenge
traditionally limited views of how it matters. After articulating the
proposed network model of securities markets, this Article outlines the
model's implications for securities market transition. Specifically, it
highlights two categories of network inefficiencies that may help explain
the persistent weaknesses of securities markets in Russia and other
transitional states. The model suggests such inefficiencies may also arise in
the modernization of established securities markets, however, implying
lessons for the United States and other developed economies as well.
Where network effects undermine the spontaneous emergence of
strong markets, this Article proposes a limited coordination of market
expectations-as distinct from law's demarcation of property rights and
enforcement of contracts, as conventionally acknowledged, and its
protection of minority investors, as recently emphasized by "law matters"
corporate and securities law scholars-as a central role for law in the very
creation and design of strong securities markets.
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INTRODUCTION
[M]arkets are not a fixture of the economy, but are the results

of decisions made by private economic agents and government
agencies.I

[W]e should not expect exchanges
to be loosely run
2
organizationsthat arise as if by magic.

Faced with the persistent absence of strong securities markets across
the globe, from the transitional economies of Central and Eastern Europe,
to the developed economies of Germany and Japan, students of securities
markets have turned to first questions: Does law matter in the creation of
3
strong securities markets? Do markets emerge, or are they made?
Corporate and securities law scholars have identified, at most, an
indirect role for law in the market transition process. Rather than creating
and shaping markets, this view suggests, law's role is limited to creating a
framework within which securities markets will spontaneously emerge.
Specifically, law and economics have suggested two key contributions of
law to such a framework. Most significantly, law's articulation of clear
property rights and provision of reliable contract enforcement have been

1. Walter P. Heller, Equilibrium Market Formation Causes Missing Markets, in MARKETS,
INFORMATION, AND UNCERTAINTY: ESSAYS IN ECONOMIC THEORY IN HONOR OF KENNETH J. ARROW
235, 235 (Graciela Chichilnisky ed., 1999) [hereinafter MARKETS, INFORMATION, AND UNCERTAINTY]
(citing Kenneth J. Arrow, The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of
Market vs. Non-Market Allocation, in THE ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE: THE PPB SYSTEM 47
(1969)).
2. J. Harold Mulherin, Jeffrey M. Netter & James A. Overdahl, Prices Are Property: The
Organizationof FinancialExchanges From A Transaction Cost Perspective,34 J.L. & ECON. 591, 593
(1991).
3. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Is CorporateLaw Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis,
84 Nw. U.L. REV. 542 (1990); Brian R. Cheffins, Does Law Matter? The Separationof Ownership and
Control in the United Kingdom, 30 J. LEG. STUD. 459 (2001); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as
History: The Prospectsfor Global Convergence in CorporateGovernance and Its Implications, 93 Nw.
U.L. REV. 641, 643-44 (1999) [hereinafter Coffee, Future as History] ("Such data understandably
fascinates legal scholars because it suggests a conclusion that financial economists tend to slight:
namely, law matters."); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and
the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, Il1 YALE L.J. 1, 59 (2001) [hereinafter Coffee,
Rise of Dispersed Ownership].
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identified as essential precursors to the emergence of strong markets.4
More recently, corporate law scholars have posited that law's protection of
minority investors might also matter, given the dependence of public
securities markets on investors' willingness to surrender control of their
5
assets.
The present analysis does not question the importance of each of these
elements in the legal framework for the appearance of strong securities
markets. Instead, drawing on recent finance analysis of securities market
structure 6 and on microeconomic analysis of so-called network effects, it
suggests a more direct role for law in the creation of securities markets.
This additional role for law arises from a reconceptualization of the
basic economics of equity securities markets. Starting from securities
markets' core financial functions-the provision of liquidity and efficient
price discovery-I highlight the presence of network economies, and
consequent network effects, in securities market trade. Securities markets,
I suggest, exhibit increasing returns to scale, on the demand side. As with
more traditional network goods, the utility of markets and the securities
traded on them grows with additional participation and use.7 The network
4. See R.H. COASE, ESSAYS ON ECONOMICS AND ECONOMISTS 11 (1994) (noting importance of
"an appropriate system of property rights (and that.., rights are enforced)"); R.H. Coase, The Problem
of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 19, 32-33, 43-44 (1960) (suggesting need to analyze and define rights
in property). See also Frank B. Cross, Law and Economic Growth, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1737, 1741, 174353 (2002); David E. Van Zandt, The Market As a Property Institution: Rules for the Trading of
Financial Assets, 32 B.C. L. REV. 967, 991 (1991).
5. See Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities
Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 783 (2001) (describing law's provision of confidence to minority
investors that they will not be cheated as "essential prerequisite[]" to strong public securities markets);
Coffee, Future as History, supra note 3, at 644 ("Absent such protections, most investors will be
reluctant to make equity investments .. ").See also ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 5-6 (1932) (identifying "separation of ownership and

control" as central feature of the modem corporation). Like the earlier identification of law's role in
defining property interests and enforcing contracts, which arose out of the insights of the New
Institutional Economics, the recent emphasis on legal protections of minority investors also draws on
the work of economists. Specifically, it cites a growing body of finance literature finding an empirical
correlation between the strength of securities markets and their protection of minority shareholders.
See, e.g., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Legal
Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131, 1149 (1997).
6. To date, this work has received relatively little attention in the legal literature. See Frank
Partnoy, Why Markets Crash and What Law Can Do About It, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 741, 744 (2000)
("Finance and law often are ships passing in the night."). Highlighting the need for legal scholars to
give greater attention to the finance literature, Frank Partnoy recently proposed "to introduce two major
branches of scholarship-one in finance, one in law-to each other." See id. Introductions having been
made, the present analysis might be read as an attempt to help them get to know each other.
7. See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects,
86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 481 (1998) (describing network markets as those "in which the value that
consumers place on a good increases as others use the good"); Howard A. Shelanski & J. Gregory
Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (2001) ("A network
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model of equity securities markets that follows from this analysis-not
previously evaluated in the legal literature, and only recently given

attention even among finance scholars-has significant implications for
law's role in securities market transition. Specifically, it predicts the
existence of multiple, network-related barriers to the spontaneous
8
emergence of strong securities markets.
If network effects thereby suggest why law might matter in the

creation of strong securities markets, what are their implications for how
law might matter? Put differently, if network effects are the 'problem' of
securities market creation-or at least part of the problem-then what
might be law's role in its resolution? In securities market transition, I

conclude, law's essential function is to coordinate expectations across an
array of securities market participants, from market sponsors to market

professionals, and from issuers to investors.
Such a coordinative function can be distinguished from law's
facilitation of cooperation, which legal analysis has traditionally viewed as

law's primary, if not exclusive, function. In the latter case, law seeks to
restrain divergent interests, in the service of a common good. 9 In the
creation of networked securities markets, on the other hand, parties'
interests are not primarily divergent, leading law to play a different role.
Coordination becomes law's key function, and expression replaces sanction
as its primary tool. As a consequence, the potential private role in
10
regulation also grows in range and significance.
externality, or 'network effect,' exists when the value of a product or service increases with the breadth
of demand for that product or service.").
8. The alteration of expected welfare outcomes by network effects has been a subject of
growing interest among legal scholars. Even in securities law, there has been some reference to
network effects, though primarily with regard to disclosure requirements, accounting rules, and other
securities law mandates, in which network efficiencies have been argued to arise from a wider use of
compatible standards. See, e.g., Coffee, Future as History, supra note 3, at 692-97 (suggesting
desirability of mandatory rules for foreign issuers, based on network externalities). There has been no
extended analysis of the place of network effects in the basic finance, structure, and regulation of
securities markets, however, nor any evaluation of their implications for the role of law in securities
market transition.
9. See Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649,
1651 (2000).
10. Study of this regulatory pattern in securities law is particularly appropriate, given a tendency
in this direction, even in ordinary, nontransitional securities law. Securities regulators have thus made
broad use of self-regulatory mechanisms, see Mark Borrelli, Market Making in the ElectronicAge, 32
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 815, 827 (2001) ("In regulating the securities industry, the SEC relies heavily on a
well-entrenched self-regulatory system .... "), creating a grand experiment that is fertile ground for a
broader understanding of law and its function. See infra Part III.D (discussing quasi-public character of
National Association of Securities Dealers and Financial Accounting Standards Board).
An emphasis on securities law is also appealing, given the seeming correlation of strong
securities markets with economic growth, a central concern of the transitional states on which I focus.
See Coffee, Rise of Dispersed Ownership, supra note 3, at 5 (noting that a "growing body of research
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As evident in the concrete applications noted below, the proposed
network analysis of securities markets and law's part in their creation has
its most immediate application in the still incomplete economic
transformation of Central and Eastern Europe. In Russia, notwithstanding
a decade of effort and expectation, strong securities markets have yet to
emerge." Law's failure to define property rights and protect minority
shareholders have undoubtedly contributed to this lack of success.' 2 The
absence of strong securities markets in Russia stems in part, however, from
a failure to incorporate law into the resolution of fundamental-and
network-related--questions of capital market design, including the basic
choice of securities markets over banks as the dominant source of corporate
3
finance, and the ensuing selection of a particular securities trading model.'
Given the centrality of network effects to these questions, their resolutionor at least their efficient resolution-may simply be impossible without
law.
These questions are not unique to Russia and its fellow travelers,
however, but arise in developed markets as well. 14 Securities market
transition in Russia may therefore serve as a laboratory of sorts, in which
suggests that an active securities market is an engine for economic growth"); La Porta, supra note 5.
See also ROBERT B. AHDIEH, RUSSIA'S CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND
THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY 1985-1996 182 (1997) (highlighting importance of strong capital
markets to success of transition process).
11. See Bernard S. Black, Reinier Kraakman & Anna Tarassova, Russian Privatization and
Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1731, 1734-35 (2000) (analyzing
failure of market reform in Russia and discussing reasons for that failure); Celia R. Taylor, Capital
Market Development in the Emerging Markets. Time to Teach an Old Dog Some New Tricks, 45 AM. J.
COMP. L. 71 (1997).
12. Along with other problems-legal and otherwise-that stand in the way of successful market
transition. One might highlight, for example, the 'lemons' problem of potential Russian market makers.
How can the latter adequately assure potential investors, trading partners, and others of their own
honesty and the market's reliability? Law-in the form of clearly delineated property rights, and
consistent contract enforcement-may be one answer. See Van Zandt, supra note 4, at 971 (discussing
need for people to feel secure in their entitlements if they are to invest in those entitlements). Yet
listing standards, bonding mechanisms, and other private measures may also suffice. See Coffee, Rise
of Dispersed Ownership, supra note 3, at 37-39.
13. These questions, along with the choice of a primarily domestic or foreign listing model for
corporate entities in the relevant market (for example, listing via American Depository Receipts and
analogous instruments, or on domestic exchanges), and the ultimate need to develop an effective
linkage system to ensure efficient trading among disparate exchanges and other trading systems, will be
used in the ensuing analysis to highlight network effects' concrete implications for securities market
transition.
14. Securities market transition occurs in developed economies, but simply comes in the form of
market restructuring, rather than market creation. By way of example, one might highlight the National
Market System regulatory effort in the United States. See Jonathan R. Macey & David D. Haddock,
Shirking at the SEC: The Failure of the National Market System, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 315. 1 more
fully evaluate the National Market System endeavor, within a network effects paradigm, in a
forthcoming work.
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the evolution of securities markets, ordinarily an extended process,
stretched out over decades, if not centuries, can be observed in real time.
An understanding of securities market creation, like the "first three
minutes" in the life of the universe, 15 may therefore help elucidate the
nature and evolution of securities markets generally, whether in Moscow,
New York, or Abidjan.
Part I articulates the core premise, and resulting model: that the basic
functions of securities markets, providing liquidity and efficient price
discovery, are best understood as a form of network effect. It further
highlights the relative breadth and depth of securities market networks.
In Part II, I set the proposed network model of securities markets in
motion, assessing the implications of potential network inefficiencies for
the emergence of strong securities markets. Specifically, I suggest that
network-related market failures may prevent strong securities markets from
efficiently emerging and evolving-highlighting why law might matter, in
at least some transitions.
In Part III, finally, I turn to the question of how law might therefore
matter in securities market transition, suggesting that an appreciation of the
network character of securities markets, and of the resulting barriers to
their efficient emergence, serves to clarify the specific function of law in
market transition. If network effects are central to why law matters, I
argue, they point to law's coordination of market expectations-an
unusual, but still limited, function, and one more in the nature of process,
than legislation-as the specific role of law that matters. Part III concludes
with some preliminary thoughts on the specific regulatory forms and
mechanisms that might be best suited to law's coordinative function in
market transition.
I. TOWARD A NETWORK MODEL OF STRONG SECURITIES
MARKETS
[C]ompetition with other exchanges will lead to prices which
induce the socially optimal purchases by customers. This is just
another application of the Fundamental Theorem of Welfare
Economics. The only difficulty with this16applicationarises when
there are externalitiesacrossexchanges.

15.
See STEVEN WEINBERG, THE FIRST THREE MINUTES: A MODERN VIEW OF THE ORIGIN OF
THE UNIVERSE (1988) (suggesting that first three minutes prepared universe with all the necessary
materials to start life).
16. Daniel R. Fischel & Sanford J. Grossman, Customer Protection in Futures and Securities
Markets. 4 J. FUTURES MKTS. 273. 292 (1984).
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While the presence of network effects has been explored in any
number of industries and technologies, 17 their existence and implications in
securities markets have not been widely considered. In particular, their
significant ramifications for the role of law in the creation and restructuring
of securities markets have been overlooked in both scholarly and policy
analyses. Yet the existence of network effects is readily apparent in
8
securities markets' basic functions.'
While securities markets have been described to serve a variety of
functions,' 9 two stand out. 20 These are the provision of liquidity, to both
17. In addition to the telephone, the most commonly noted network technology, see, e.g.,
Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 7, at 5, another paradigmatic network good is personal computer
operating systems. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 7, at 535; Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 7, at
59. Here, the critical network virtues include increased software availability, see Robert A. Levy,
Microsoft and the Browser Wars, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1321, 1353 (1999) (arguing that consumers benefit
when software manufacturers take advantage of network effects to create greater numbers of compatible
products), more ready exchange of software and data prepared with use of that software, see Mark A.
Lemley, Standardizing Government Standard-Setting Policy for Electronic Commerce, 14 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 745, 746-47 (1999) (arguing that global telecommunications systems should have
compatible software in international electronic commerce, so that buyer and seller information can be
exchanged), and easier access to repair and other secondary services, see Margaret Renee Herman, Are
We Learning From the Mistakes of Environmentalists? The Application of Environmental
Harmonization Models to the Automotive Industry, 16 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. LAW 543, 551 (1999)
(arguing that use of common standard allows for efficiency in developing training programs). Network
effects have also been observed in an array of nontechnological goods and services. Starr and
Stinchcombe even evaluate money as a network good. See Ross M. Starr & Maxwell B. Stinchcombe,
Exchange in a Network of Trading Posts, in MARKETS, INFORMATION, AND UNCERTAINTY, supra note

1, at 218 (characterizing money as public good among array of networked traders).
18. The finance and economics foundation of this analysis should not be taken to be synonymous
with the conclusion that finance, or economics more generally, is all that matters in the emergence of
strong securities markets. I make use of a law and economics framework for the largely unappreciated
insight it provides into the market transition process and not to suggest that it constitutes the only
possible frame of reference into this complex phenomenon.
19. See David M. Schizer, Benign Restraint: The SEC's Regulation of Execution Systems, 101
YALE L.J. 1551, 1552-53 (1992) (noting five functions of security markets).
20. Before reaching the core functions of securities markets, we face the preliminary question of
what is a 'securities market'? Historically, a given securities market was defined by the finite trading
activity on a particular trading floor, as on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), or the Boston,
Pacific, and Philadelphia exchanges. See Marhsall E. Blume & Michael A. Goldstein, Quotes, Order
Flow, and Price Discovery, 52 J. FIN. 221, 222 (1997) (noting various national, regional, and electronic
"markets" in the United States). The interrelated rise of computer and communications technologies
and wide dissemination of stock price information, however, have undermined any such definition. See
RUBEN LEE, WHAT IS AN EXCHANGE? THE AUTOMATION, MANAGEMENT AND REGULATION OF

FINANCIAL MARKETS 1 (1998). See also Mulherin, supra note 2, at 629 (describing notion that
advanced technology will produce shift away from centralized exchanges, so that the market is "a price,
not a place"). Consequently, a definition grounded in the identical pricing of homogenous goods-the
law of one price-today more accurately identifies the relevant 'market' in any given security. See
William J. Carney, Jurisdictional Choice in Securities Regulation, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 718, 730 (2001).
See also GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 85 (3d ed. 1966) (defining "market" as "the area
within which the price of a commodity tends to uniformity"); Mark Klock, The SEC's New Regulation
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investors and corporate enterprises, and the facilitation of efficient price
discovery. 2 1 Other functions, most significantly the efficient allocation of
scarce capital, are best understood as arising from this pair.
In securities markets, liquidity measures immediacy, that is, the ability
to timely execute a buy or sell order, 22 and price resiliency, investors'
23
ability to trade without moving the price of a security against themselves.
Through these twin elements, liquidity allows investors to dispose of their
holdings with minimal search or other transactions costs. 24
Such
minimization of trading friction is essential to the character of equity
securities, much of the value of which, as described below, is tied to ease of
resale. 25
Liquidity also benefits corporate issuers, meanwhile, by
26
enhancing share value and providing a ready market for additional shares.
Tied to their provision of liquidity, securities markets also serve
critical information functions. 27 Specifically, they facilitate efficient price
ATS: Placing the Myth of Market FragmentationAhead of Economic Analysis, 51 FLA. L. REV. 756,
793 (1999). "Even though individual trades may be executed in different market centers, dealers have
homogenous beliefs and therefore quote identical prices. We refer to this system as a consolidated
market." See Ananth Madhavan, Consolidation, Fragmentation, and the Disclosure of Trading
Information, 8 REV. FIN. STUD. 579, 582-83 (1995) (emphasis in original).
21.
See Norman S. Poser, The Stock Exchanges of the United States and Europe: Automation,
Globalization, and Consolidation, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 497, 501 (2001) (stating that stock
exchange functions are "providing liquidity and setting securities prices"). See also WILLIAM A. KLEIN
& JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES

382 (7th ed. 2000).
22. See Paul D. Cohen, Securities Trading Via the Internet, 4 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 12
(1999). See also Klock, supra note 20, at 786.
23. "The second characteristic of liquidity, emphasized more strongly in recent times, is degree
of freedom from the risk of fluctuation in capital value." THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN
ECONOMICS 248 (David W. Pearce ed., 4th ed. 1992). See generally EITAN A. AVNEYON, DICTIONARY
OF FINANCE 282 (1988) (defining liquidity); Poser, supra note 21, at 512 (discussing liquidity in
financial markets).
24. See Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, Liquidity, Volatility, and Exchange Automation, 3 J.
ACCT. AUDITING & FIN. 369, 369 (1988) ("Liquidity is what markets are all about."); Nicholas
Economides, How to Enhance Market Liquidity, in GLOBAL EQUITY MARKETS: TECHNOLOGICAL,
COMPETITIVE, AND REGULATORY CHALLENGES 90, 91 (Robert A. Schwartz ed., 1995) [hereinafter
GLOBAL EQUITY MARKETS] (describing role of liquidity in financial exchange markets). See also
Ananth Madhavan, Trading Mechanisms in Securities Markets, 47 J. FIN. 607, 608 (1992) ("The crucial
function of a trading mechanism is to transform the latent demands of investors into realized
transactions.").
25. See infra notes 59-73 and accompanying text; Van Zandt, supra note 4, at 972-73.
26. See Merritt B. Fox & Michael A. Heller, Corporate Governance Lessons From Russian
EnterpriseFiascoes,75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1720, 1760-61 (2000) (noting that public ownership produces
lower cost of capital because firm's more liquid shares can be sold at higher price).
27. See Stephen J. Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers:A Market Based Proposal,88 CAL. L.
REV. 279, 320 (2000) (arguing that information, such as transaction price and volume information,
gives market signals on how investors value securities). See also Joel Hasbrouck, One Security, Many
Markets: Determining the Contributions to Price Discovery, 50 J. FIN. 1175, 1175 (1995)
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discovery in both economic and financial terms.2 8 In economic terms, they
determine market-clearing prices based on the cumulative supply and
demand collected by the market. 29 In finance terms, they allow for the
30
efficient incorporation of information into price.
Although not ordinarily characterized as 'such in the legal literature,
and only recently evaluated in these terms even by finance scholars, the
twin functions of liquidity and price discovery are arguably best understood
in network terms. 31 This characterization becomes readily apparent in the
mechanisms through which liquidity and price discovery are actually
achieved.

("[Fragmentation] is of concern to financial economists and regulators because price information and
price discovery (the impounding of new information into the security price), arguably the most
important products of a security market, have many attributes of a public good."); Stephen Craig
Pirrong, The Efficient Scope of Private Transactions-Cost-Reducing Institutions: The Successes and
Failures of Commodity Exchanges, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 229, 241-42 (1995).
Arguably, securities markets' price discovery function may be even more significant than its
provision of liquidity. Amir Licht argues as much, pointing out that liquidity is provided by market
participants themselves, while price discovery is a unique product of the market. See Licht, infra note
28, at 621 n.158.
28. See Amir Licht, The 16th Sokol Colloquium: The Privatization of Securities Laws: Stock
Exchange Mobility, UnilateralRecognition, and the Privatizationof Securities Regulation, 41 VA. J.
INT'L L. 583, 621 (2001) ("The integrity of the price discovery process is crucial to the success of a
stock exchange that operates in a competitive environment."). See also Mulherin, supra note 2, at 594.
29. See Madhavan, supra note 24, at 608 ("The crucial function of a trading mechanism is to
transform the latent demands of investors into realized transactions. The key to this transformation is
price discovery, the process of finding market clearing prices.") (emphasis added). The more "buy and
sell orders come together in a single market," the more completely the market reflects the full extent of
supply and demand, and not some localized or limited segment of it. See Paul D. Cohen, Securities
Trading Via the Internet, 4 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 1, 25 (1999). In turn, the more accurate pricing will
be, with sale price more closely approximating equilibrium value. See id.
30. See Madhavan, supra note 24, at 607. But see Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being
Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV.
613 (1988) (challenging assumption of efficient markets). Efficient pricing allows stock markets to
serve other essential functions, including the efficient allocation of limited capital-one of the
fundamental benefits of public securities markets. See Poser, supra note 21, at 512. See also Van
Zandt, supra note 4, at 980-81. A related element of securities markets' price discovery function is
their tendency to reduce price variability, and hence market uncertainty. See Caroline Bradley,
Disorderly Conduct: Day Tradersand the Ideology of "Fairand Orderly Markets," 26 J. CORP. L. 63,
80 (2000) (noting securities exchanges' goal to reduce price volatility). See also Nicholas Economides,
Network Economics with Application to Finance, 2 FIN. MARKETS, INST. & INSTR., Dec. 1993, at 89,
91 (reasoning that network externalities produce "reduction in realized market uncertainty").
31.
See Carmine Di Noia, Competition and Integration Among Stock Exchanges in Europe:
Network Effects, Implicit Mergers and Remote Access, 7 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 39, 41 (2001) "Exchanges
can be considered as networks in which the greater the number of customers, the higher the utility for
everyone." Id.
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At some level, each follows from an increase in the number of market
participants trading in the relevant stock.3 2 As more sellers and potential
purchasers appear, more bid and ask orders follow, closing the bid-ask
spread, and providing more ready convertibility of the stock to cash, i.e.,
liquidity. 33 "IT]he fact that some orders are sent to a particular trading
system makes it more likely that other orders sent to the34same trading
system will be executed; in short, liquidity attracts liquidity."
Increased orders likewise produce rough improvements in price
accuracy and stability. 35 Additional bids and offers both enhance the
supply and demand captured by the market and introduce more complete
information, increasing the proximity of market price to equilibrium value.
36
This, in turn, can also be expected to improve price stability.
32. "More liquidity exists in the market as the number of each type of participant increases."
Alberto Cybo-Ottone, Carmine Di Noia & Maurizio Murgia, Recent Developments in the Structure of
Securities Markets, in BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 223, 245 (Robert E.

Litan & Anthony M. Santomero eds., 2000). See Nicholas Economides & Aloysius Siow, The Division
of Markets Is Limited by the Extent of Liquidity (Spatial Competition with Externalities), 78 AM. ECON.
REV. 108, 109 (1988) ("Liquidity at a market can only be increased by increasing the number of traders
at that market."). Although somewhat oversimplified, because the number of traders primarily serves as
a proxy for the volume of trade, the true variable of interest, this notion essentially holds true.
33. See Cybo-Ottone et al., supra note 32, at 247 ("One indicator of network scope is the number
of participants."); Ian Domowitz, Electronic Derivatives Exchanges: Implicit Mergers, Network
Externalities,and Standardization, 35 Q. REV. ECON. & FIN. 163, 168 (1995) ("[T]he driving force

behind exchange structure is the liquidity effect. This, in turn, is driven by the size and scope of the
network of traders making the adoption decision."). See also Nicholas Economides, Liquidity and
Markets, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY ON MONEY AND FINANCE 594 (Peter Newman et al.

eds., 1992); Nicholas Economides, The Impact of the Internet on FinancialMarkets, I J. FIN. TRANS.,
Apr. 2001, at 8, 10 (noting liquidity, and hence efficiency, gains from additional traders) [hereinafter
Economides, Impact of the Internet].
34. Di Noia, supra note 31, at 55. See also Stephen Craig Pirrong, The Self-Regulation of
Commodity Exchanges: The Case of Market Manipulation, 38 J.L. & ECON. 141, 155 n.24 (1995)
("Liquidity effects make this simultaneous choice of market a game of coordination, and inefficient
equilibria usually exist in these games.").
35. "Regarding stock exchanges, they can be seen as networks where the more traders (drawn
from the same distribution of uncertain endowments) enter the market, the more market uncertainty
(measured by the variance of market prices) is diminished." Di Noia, supra note 31, at 52. See
Nicholas Economides, The Economics of Networks, 14 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 673, 679 (1996) ("Higher
participation of traders on both sides of the market... decreases the variance of the expected market

price and increases the expected utility of risk-averse traders.").
36. To be clear, this is not a "greater fool" approach, see Joseph Bankman & Marcus Cole, The
Venture Capital Investment Bust: Did Agency Costs Play a Role? Was it Something Lawyers Helped
Structure?, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 211, 220 (2001) (defining "greater fool" notion of investing), or
Malkiel's "castles-in-the-air" concept, see BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL
STREET 128-29 (1991). The presence of more traders does not mean that someone will come along
who values the stock more than you, and you will thereby profit. Rather, the argument is a more
limited one. Regardless of whether the newcomer is a fool or genius, he or she will increase market
liquidity, which enhances the value of your holding. If all are geniuses, it may well be that the price of
your stock holding will fall. Even in that case, however, the liquidity value of the stock has increased.

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:277

The network implications of this pattern are relatively apparent, if
little noted. Network effects are positive consumption externalities; 37 they
arise where the utility of a good to one user increases as other users acquire
38
or utilize it.
Equities markets operate in just this network manner, in their liquidity
and price discovery functions. As additional traders come to market, the
extent of liquidity and price discovery available to existing traders
progressively grows. 39 Equities markets are thus a classic network, in
which the value of the good-a given stock, the market in that stock, and,
as we shall see, the market generally-increases with each incremental
expansion in the size of its network (i.e., the network of traders). 40 In more
37.
1 use the term network effects, rather than network externalities, as the latter assumes a
market failure, which may or may not be true as to any given network effect. See S.J. Liebowitz &
Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality:An Uncommon Tragedy, J. ECON. PERSP., Spr. 1994, at 133,
135. See also Lemley & McGowan, supra note 7, at 482 n.5.
38.
See supra note 7. See also Gideon Parchomovsky, Publish or Perish, 98 MICH. L. REV. 926,
945 (2000); Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Choice of Form and Network Externalities, 43
WM & MARY L. REV. 79, 110 (2001). The owner of the paradigmatic network good, the telephone,
derives no utility from it, unless others own units as well, see Michael Klausner, Corporations,
Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 772 (1995); Lemley & McGowan,
supra note 7, at 488 (noting that "owning the only telephone or fax machine in the world would be of
little benefit because it could not be used to communicate with anyone"); further, their utility continues
to grow with each additional telephone purchase, see Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network
Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424 (1985); Lemley & McGowan,
supra note 7, at 488-89 ("The value of the telephone or fax machine one has already purchased
increases with each additional purchaser, so long as all machines operate on the same standards and the
network infrastructure is capable of processing all member communications."). The owner of a tea
kettle, conversely, may find great benefit in its water capacity, built-in whistle, and other inherent
qualities, but has relatively little interest in the number of other tea drinkers. The utility derived from a
telephone thus arises from the size of its network of users, see Di Noia, supra note 31, at 52 ("Positive
network externalities (the benefit to an individual increases in the number of others on the system) arise
when a good is more valuable to a user the more users adopt the same good or a compatible one.");
Katz & Shapiro, supra, at 424 ("[TIhe utility that a given user derives from the good depends upon the
number of other users who are in the same 'network."'), while that of a tea kettle turns on its inherent
value.
39.
See Brett Frischmann, Privatization and Commercialization of the Iternet lIfrastructure:
Rethinking Market Intervention into Government and Government Intervention into the Market, 2
COLUM. Sci. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 34-35 (2001) (noting that value of interet increases with
interconnection of more users); William J. Kolasky, Network Effects: A Contrarian View, 7 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 577, 579 (1999) (noting that value to each customer increases as more friends and
family join network). In this regard, some analogy might be made to the more tangible case of eBay,
the intemet auction site. Consistent with the pattern described, additional participants in eBay, whether
sellers or buyers, have progressively helped to enhance its value, leading to its ultimate dominance of
the market.
40. See Domowitz, supra note 33, at 164-65 ("Second, the benefit to an individual increases in
the number of others on the system. This is sometimes called the 'network externality,' because each
new user confers a benefit on all other users. In trading terms, we might call it a liquidity effect .... ");
Amir Licht, Stock Exchange Mobiliy,, Unilateral Recognition, and the Privatization of Securities
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familiar terms, networked securities markets exhibit decreasing, rather than
increasing, transactions costs with additional traders.
Within this paradigm, what is the relevant benefit to existing traders,
i.e., the network effect? It is seemingly the very liquidity and price
accuracy/stability that the market is designed to achieve. Network
economies can therefore be understood as the foundation of organized
markets' role as sources of liquidity and price discovery. For the same
reason, the proposed model of securities markets as a network industry
distinguishes them from most network goods, such as telephones and
personal computers, in which the network effect is a secondary
consequence, to be managed or controlled. Here, by contrast, the network
effect is the precise result desired. 41 Rather than secondary effects,
network economies stand at the heart of why organized markets exist and
42
function as they do.

Regulation, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 583, 621 n.158 (2001). It bears emphasizing that the network function in
securities markets is not of the same linearity as the network effects in telephone or computer operating
systems. Thus, as the number of traders and volume of trade progress beyond a certain point, greater
anonymity and increase prospects of both rational and irrational herd behavior create at least the
possibility that market quality may decline. Of course, even traditional network technologies have the
potential for such decreasing returns, if not diseconomies of scale, at some point sufficiently far along
the demand curve. With conventional goods, however, these patterns can be expected to arise at higher
levels of demand and to be more susceptible to technological remedy than would be similar patterns in
securities trading.
41.
By this, I do not mean to suggest that network value constitutes a greater proportion of the
value of equity securities than of the several technologies noted. Cf infra notes 52, 67. Rather, it is the
centrality of the network effects of liquidity and price discovery to the basic function of organized
markets that I aim to highlight.
42. While the present analysis emphasizes additional traders as the network mechanism in
securities markets, the arrival of additional issuers is to similar effect: Not only do additional traders
enhance market efficiency, but likewise additional listings. Cybo-Ottone and his co-authors thus start
with issuers/listings. See Cybo-Ottone et al., supra note 32, at 248-49 (suggesting that strong network
effects arise more from increased listings than from increased traders); id. at 256 ("Order flow seems to
attract order flow, but more at the level of an individual stock than globally, which is why listing
supremacy remains relevant."). See also Di Noia, supra note 31, at 41 (framing listing evaluation: "All
else being equal, firms want to be listed where other firms are listed ....
").Notably, this emphasis
causes Cybo-Ottone and his co-authors to ground some part of the increased network returns in
reputational improvements. See Cybo-Ottone et al., supra note 32, at 248-49 (highlighting relationship
of network growth patterns in foreign listings on New York Stock Exchange and reputational
implications of participating on largest trading network). Di Noia, meanwhile, explicitly separates out a
trader and an issuer analysis of network effects, characterizing the listing network as producing a directnetwork effect and increased traders as producing a cross-network effect. See Di Noia, supra note 31,
at 53 (defining "cross-network externality" as circumstance in which "Iu]tility derives from an increase
in the compution of a different good belonging, in a sense, to the same network") (emphasis in original).
She also seems to recognize the potentially greater importance of the trader network, however. See id.
Moreover, it is not entirely clear that Di Noia's distinction is consistent. Although she highlights the
listing analysis, her assessment is largely grounded in the number of traders. See id. Finally, an
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How broad are the implications of network effects in securities
markets, however? While the utility gains of improved liquidity and price
discovery are directed, in the first and highest order, to the market in an
individual equity issue (i.e., additional traders in Microsoft stock most
directly enhance the liquidity and price quality of Microsoft stock), such
gains are ultimately dispersed more broadly. 43 To varying degrees, new
traders in a given stock also enhance the utility of market participants
trading in entirely different stock.44 This arises from the implications of
modern finance theory for the cross-pollination of liquidity and price
discovery effects among multiple traders in multiple stocks.
By way of an intuitive example, shareholders in FFLC Bancorp, one
of the smallest companies listed on NASDAQ, 45 likely derive utility from
the presence of Microsoft, Intel, and Cisco-three of the largest companies
on the market.46 This suggests that the liquidity of FFLC Bancorp is
shaped not only by the liquidity of the market in that stock, but by the
liquidity of the entire market on which the stock trades. 47 Modern finance

entirely different analysis would be one focused on "the number of locations from which the market
may be accessed." See Domowitz, supra note 33, at 164.
43. See Economides, supra note 30, at 90-91 ("Under uncertainty, the expansion of countermatching offers (created by the expansion of the network) can be beneficial to market participants even
when the counter-matching offers (or the traders who make them) are drawn from the same
distribution.").
44. See Cybo-Ottone et al., supra note 32, at 245 ("Intermediaries want to be present at the
exchanges where more firms and intermediaries are present, as it is more attractive to their final
customers (investors) and to their own portfolios and risk management.").
45. See NASDAQ, http://quotes.nasdaq.com(accessed Dec. 6, 2002) (listing market
capitalization of $104,503,780).
46. See Di Noia, supra note 31, at 42.
It is plausible that, ceteris paribus, when firms decide to be listed on an exchange, they
choose the one with more intermediaries and firms due to the greater liquidity on the market.
The same strategy is followed by the intermediaries that want to become members of that
exchange (unless regulations prohibit this choice).
Id. Again, one might think of eBay, which draws together buyers and sellers of a wide array of
products (from tea kettles to telephones), who nonetheless benefit from each other's presence-a
network gain. See Richard Warner, Border Disputes: Trespass to Chattels on the Internet, 47 VILL. L.
REV. 117, 132-35 (2002) (discussing positive network effect created by self-perpetuating expectation
on eBay: "Buyers and sellers use eBay because they expect other buyers and sellers to use it.").
47. The extension of liquidity and price discovery effects across multiple stock is suggested by
the very reference to the liquidity of a market, as opposed to the individual stocks listed on that market.
See Cybo-Ottone et al., supra note 32, at 247 (stating that "liquidity is often measured by the number of
listed companies"). See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, The Ambiguous Boundaries Between Public and
Private Securities Markets, 51 CASE W. RES. 483, 486 (2001) (describing NYSE as liquid market). To
similar effect are references to the volume of trade of an entire market, versus that of a specific stock.
See Cybo-Ottone et al., supra note 32, at 246 ("For trading, it is common to look at exchange liquidity
in terms of the volume traded."). See, e.g., Daniel M. Gallagher, Move Over Tickertape, Here Comes
the Cyber-Exchange: The Rise of Internet-Based Securities Trading Systems, 47 CATH. U. L. REV.
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confirms this intuition and its implications for the reach of network effects
beyond individual securities to the market as a whole. Thus, finance
models of pricing, diversification, and risk suggest a broad reach of
network effects through the equity securities markets.
These implications arise from the comparability, substitutability, and
In light of these
complementary nature of equity securities. 48
characteristics, the potential purchaser of any given stock is also a potential
purchaser of other stocks, based on various factors of diversification and
effective management of systematic and nonsystematic risk. The positive
welfare implications of additional traders in Microsoft, Intel, or Cisco for
arise from the fact that they are also
the market in FFLC Bancorp therefore
49
Bancorp.
FFLC
in
traders
potential

1009, 1019 (1998) ("The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) has the highest share volume and dollar
value of trades among the exchanges.").
48. See Jay W. Eisenhofer & John L. Reed, Valuation Litigation, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 37, 116
(1997) (describing comparable company approach to company valuation, including need to identify
comparable publicly-traded companies); Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of
Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1930 n.83 (noting comparability of equity
securities); Lynn A. Stout, Corporate Finance: How Efficient Markets Undervalue Stocks: CAPM and
ECMH Under Conditions of Uncertainty & Disagreement, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 475, 484 (1997)
(describing conventional theory's implication that no equity share is a bargain relative to any other
firm's shares, making all stocks perfect substitutes).
49. Modem Portfolio Theory ("MPT") and the Capital Asset Pricing Model ("CAPM"), in
tandem with the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis ("ECMH"), teach that equity shares are
essentially substitutes, which should be collected together in a risk-diversified portfolio. Given as
much, traders cannot be thought of as being in the market for a particular stock, but rather for any stock
with a certain level of risk, as prescribed by their risk tolerance and the present composition of their
investment portfolio. On account of the dictates of diversification, meanwhile, such a portfolio must
include an array of complementary securities, and not any single equity or even small group of stocks.
Finally, given the ECMH's lessons for stock comparability and the CAPM's identification of relative
risk as the appropriate measure of comparison, the enhancement of available price information on any
given stock, through the mechanism of additional traders, must necessarily improve the quality of price
information on other stock as well. (Additional traders, of course, not only expand the data set
available in price discovery, but also enhance the skill set applied to that process.)
One caveat should be noted. As fully developed, MPT suggests a broader comparability,
substitutability, and complementarity than the proposed network analysis of singular securities markets
would seem to allow. Rather than limited to the equities traded on any single exchange, MPT finds
these characteristics applicable among equity securities traded on independent markets, and even among
equity securities and entirely different financial instruments. Can MPT be incorporated into the present
analysis, then, to suggest that network effects extend across the financial markets, without regard to the
boundaries of distinct financial instruments, trading markets, or even nations? Besides the fact that any
such network effects will necessarily be weaker in degree than network effects among the equity
securities traded on a single market, they are also meaningfully different in kind. Unlike network
effects within a single, interconnected market, any externalities between markets are Pigovian in nature,
operating by way of the price function (i.e., pecuniary externalities). As such, they are effectively
internalized. See Hugh Macaulay, Externalities, THE MCGRAw-HILL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS
379-81 (Douglas Greenwald ed., 1982).
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Network effects in equity securities markets are also likely to be of
some strength, given the separation of ownership and control in the modern
public corporation, 50 and the consequently higher proportion of network to
inherent value in equity securities.5 All goods have some mix of inherent
and network value.52 Even the paradigmatic network technologies noted
50. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 5, at 5-6.
51.
Network strength is an important consideration, as network effects will only have meaningful
welfare implications in a given industry if they are strong enough to shape its structure and
performance. See David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, A Guide to the Antitrust Economics of
Networks, 10 ANTITRUST 36, 36 (1996) (explaining that soft drinks are not a network industry,
notwithstanding the presence of network effects, because the industry is not significantly shaped by
those network effects).
52. See Klausner, supra note 38, at 763 ("In short, widespread use of a PC has a value to a user
independent of the inherent value of the product."). What I term "inherent value" and "network value"
have elsewhere been termed the "autarky value" and the "synchronization value" of a good or service.
See S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Effects and Externalities, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 671 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) [hereinafter DICTIONARY OF

ECONOMICS AND THE LAW].

It bears emphasizing that the term "inherent value," as used in the network effects literature,
is designed simply to distinguish that part of an asset's value that is impervious to a rise or fall in the
number of other users of the asset (inherent value), and that par of its value that is sensitive to the
former (network value). Thus, the network effects analysis of inherent versus network value, even as
applied to equity shares herein, is separate and apart from a finance assessment of equity valuation, or
asset valuation generally. The value of an equity security is equivalent to the future income stream that
the stock will generate, discounted to the present. See Jonathan Macey & Hideki Kanda, The Stock
Exchange As a Firn: The Emergence of Close Substitutes for the New York and Tokyo Stock
Exchanges, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1007, 1012 (1990). More specifically, of course, it is "a function of
the dividends (including any final, liquidating dividend paid when the corporation's existence ends) that
the corporation can be expected to pay out over its life." KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 21, at 274.
Rather than disputing this conventional definition, a network analysis adds to it. It suggests that the
future income stream of a particular security may be shaped in part by features impervious to the size of
that security's 'network,' but also, in part, by features sensitive to network size. See Marcel Kahan &
Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (Or "The Economics of
Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 726 n.32 (1997); Kamar, supra note 48, at 1930 (discussing network
and other elements in value of Delaware law). Even a non-salable, and hence completely illiquid,
security has a value larger than zero. That value is less, however, than it would be were the security
liquid. It is this additional value added of liquidity, for example, that network analysis would
characterize as network value. Cf KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 21, at 308 (analogously dividing value
of corporate bond into two components of annuity and lump-sum terminal payment).
Of course, even this might be read to suggest some dispute with conventional finance theory,
insofar as the latter relies on the identity of present dividend payments and a terminal 'dividend' payout arising from sale of a stock (even as adjusted to present value). See id. at 273-74. The present
analysis, thus, would characterize present dividend payments as part of a security's inherent value, but
any terminal payment as network value, because the latter depends on liquidity/salabilit' on the
terminal date. The Miller-Modigliani Theorem's implication that dividend payments can be selfconstructed, through any shareholder's sale of a discrete share amount, see Merton Miller & Franco
Modigliani, Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of Shares, 34 J. BUS. 411, 414 (1961), itself
assumes liquidity or, alternatively, the minimal level of risk necessary to utilize the shares as security
for an equivalent cash flow. Where liquidity or network value is limited, then, the value of present
dividend distributions will necessarily differ from that of discounted future dividends.
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above have some inherent value,5 3 independent of the size of their network,
or even the existence of one.5 4 A computer is a useful word processing
device, even if one never goes on the Internet, exchanges software and/or
data with other users, or purchases software beyond what is pre-installed. 5
Even a telephone has some inherent value. 56 An attractively designed unit
might have aesthetic value, and even an unattractive model might prove
valuable as a projectile in a particularly contentious argument. 57 It is
particularly in those cases where the proportion of network to inherent
value is high, however, that network effects can be expected to be strong
58
and of greater welfare and legal consequence.
Stockowners, like telephone and computer users, are very much
interested in the network of other 'users' of the relevant good.5 9 In this

53. See Klausner, supra note 38, at 772; Lemley & McGowan, supra note 7, at 586.
54. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 7, at 491 ("Unlike telephones and fax machines, an
operating system or application program will allow even a single user to perform a variety of tasks
regardless whether even a single other consumer owns the software.").
55. Cf David Dunn, Getting Organized with Your Word Processor, 82 ILL. BAR J. 571, 571
(1994) (describing utility of computer word processing for personal information management).
56. Cf David McGowan, Networks and Intention in Antitrust and Intellectual Property, 24 J.
CORP. L. 485, 501 (1999) ("The inherent value of a telephone is trivially small .... ").
57. Conversely, all goods enjoy some network value. Recall our tea kettle. While inherent value
clearly predominates, if our tea kettle was architect Michael Graves' incredibly popular 'Whistling
Bird,' it likely would have some network value as well. As my kettle becomes increasingly popular, its
'fad' value to me grows, even if it still takes just as long to boil. The benefits of having what is 'in'
thus constitute a form of network effect. See Katz & Shapiro, supra note 38, at 424 n. I (characterizing
"purely psychological, bandwagon effects" as "subtle" sources of consumption externalities). Cf
Harvey Leibenstein, Bandwagon, Snob & Veblen Effects in the Theory of Consumer's Demand, 64 Q.J.
EcON. 183, 190 (1950) (describing "bandwagon effects" as "the case where an individual will demand
more (less) of a commodity at a given price because some or all other individuals in the market also
demanded more (less) of the commodity"). Lemley, though, highlights the difference between the
payoff interaction of network effects, involving "positive utility payoffs," and the herd behavior of fads,
suggesting that the latter can easily be broken. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 7, at 598. Besides
their instability, bandwagon effects may also produce negative externalities, once the extent of
popularity overwhelms the capacity for sales and service. Notwithstanding initial positive returns to
scale, therefore, fads may produce diminishing returns beyond a certain scale.
58. Lemley and McGowan reason:
The essential criterion for locating a good along ... [the continuum from actual networks, to
virtual networks, to positive feedback phenomena] is the degree to which the good provides
inherent value to a consumer apart from any network characteristics. The greater the inherent
value of the good relative to any value added by additional customers, the less significant the
network effect.
Lemley & McGowan, supra note 7, at 488, 498 ("The ratio of inherent value to network value is of
similar importance."). See also Russell Korobkin, Inertiaand Preferencein ContractNegotiation: The
Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583, 1593-95 (1998);
Thomas B. Nachbar, Paradox and Structure: Relying on Government Regulation to Preserve the
Internet's UnregulatedStructure, 85 MINN. L. REV. 215, 272 (2000).
59. See Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of "Inaccurate" Stock Prices, 1992
DUKE L.J. 977, 1019 (arguing that investors place higher value on more liquid stocks). See also Amir
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vein, an equity share might be better understood as a standardized unit of
60
trade than as a proportionate interest in the underlying corporation.
This relative emphasis on liquidity value, or network value, 6 1 in equity
valuation arises from the nature of the firm. The modern public
62
corporation is characterized by a substantial dispersion of shareholding.
While actual share ownership varies widely among the corporation's
multiplicity of shareholders, no individual or even small group of
shareholders ordinarily holds sufficient shares to exercise authority over
management of the firm. 63 Instead, control resides with its professional
managers, producing the "separation of ownership and control" that is
64
characteristic of the modem corporation.
Given such separation, it should come as no surprise that the ability to
trade an equity share (i.e., its network value), rather than 'consume' or
control it in some fashion (i.e., its inherent value), constitutes a significant
N. Licht, Genie in a Bottle? Assessing Managerial Opportunism in International Securities
Transactions, 2000 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 51, 73 (stating that improved liquidity of stock increases
share value). Cf Amihud & Mendelson, supra note 24, at 371-72 (stating that liquidity, shaped by
market conditions and trading regulations, influences an equity's underlying value).
60. See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 62
(6th ed. 2000) (noting that fractional interest of single share of General Electric stock is .00000003
percent of the company). Describing the function of organized markets, Telser and Higinbotham
describe a world in which "standard contracts.., circulate among the traders at market determined
prices, and the participants may never wish to convert their standard contracts into the physical good."
Lester G. Telser & Harlow N. Higinbotham, Organized Futures Markets: Costs and Benefits, 85 J. POL.
EcON. 969, 971 (1977). See Van Zandt, supra note 4, at 972-73 ("In the case of financial assets,
transferability is essential. Unlike a tangible asset that can be consumed by the holder, such as land or
food, a financial asset is merely a claim on the issuer."). This vision particularly characterizes the trade
in "shares of stock," they suggest, "since rarely do the shareholders wish to liquidate the corporation."
Telser & Higinbotham, supra, at 971.
61. Although closely correlated, it bears noting that liquidity and network value are not identical
in equity securities markets. Most significantly, network value also encompasses the utility
enhancements of price discovery and stability. As referenced above and in the ensuing analysis,
therefore, liquidity is used simply as a tangible proxy for network value.
62. See John C. Coates IV, Measuring the Domain of Mediating Hierarchy: How Contestable
Are U.S. Public Corporations?, 24 J. CORP. L. 837, 848 (1999) (noting persistent dispersion of
ownership in public companies, with fewer than 20% having 35+% shareholder).
63. See George W. Dent, Jr., Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in the Public
Corporation, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 881, 882 (1989) (noting that shareholders are too scattered to
effectively exercise control). Institutional investors are the only significant potential exception. Even
their capacity for control is relatively limited, however, both in practice and by legal design. See Rado
Bohinc & Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Governance in Post-Privatized Slovenia, 49 AM. J. COMP.
L. 49, 50, 62-63 (2001) (describing entrenchment of separation of ownership and control in corporate
law norms: "In general, shareholders of public U.S. corporations have neither the legal right, the
practical ability, nor the desire to exercise the kind of control necessary for meaningful monitoring of
the corporation's agents.").
64. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 5, at 5-6. But see Coates, supra note 62, at 848 (noting
prospect of shareholder control).
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portion of an equity share's value.65 Similarly, it helps to explain why
illiquid securities are substantially discounted in value. 66 Such discounting
is regularly applied to shares of close corporations.67 Yet the clearest
example of it is restricted securities. 68 In these cases, liquidity/network
69
value is lost, and the proportion of network to inherent value falls with it.
65. See Van Zandt, supra note 4, at 972-73. To be clear, "consumption," as used here, does not
refer to any actual use or exhaustion of the good. Rather, it simply acknowledges the part of the good's
utility that is impervious to others' demand for or use of the good. In the context of equity securities,
consumption value is that part of a stock's value that is independent of its potential sale.
66. See Amihud & Mendelson, supra note 24, at 370-71; Van Zandt, supra note 4, at 973.
67. See Edwin T. Hood, John J. Mylan & Timothy P. O'Sullivan, Valuation of Closely-Held
Business Interests, 65 UMKC L. REV. 399, 445 (1997) (noting need for illiquidity discount). To similar
effect, where individual shareholders manage to secure a controlling interest in a public corporation,
allowing them to assert meaningful authority in its management, the proportion of network value to
inherent value (including control) can be expected to decline.
Shares in close corporations also help highlight the trade-off of network and inherent value in
equity securities. The liquidity, or network value of closely-held corporate shares is lower, by virtue of
their illiquidity, yet their inherent value is ordinarily higher. Assuming the greater concentration of
ownership that commonly characterizes close corporations, see Sandra L. Schlafge, Pedro v. Pedro:
Consequencesfor Closely Held Corporationsand the At-Will Doctrine in Minnesota, 76 MINN. L. REV.
1071, 1073 (1992) (noting that typical close corporation has few shareholders). See also Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporationsand Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271, 27374 (1986), and the resulting reduction in any separation of ownership and control, closely-held
corporate shares encompass greater value involving access to and control of the corporation's assetsexactly the feature lacking in public corporations' shares. It bears emphasizing, however, that the
suggestion is not that the actual value of close corporations' shares-the present value of the future
income stream they will produce-is invariably more or less than that of shares in a public corporation.
The value of a share in a close corporation may be substantially greater or smaller than any given public
corporation. The relative proportion of liquidity to consumption value, however, will be less.
68. See Mukesh Bajaj, David J. Denis, Stephen P. Ferris & Atulya Sarin, Firm Value and
Marketability Discounts, 27 J. CORP. L. 89, 90 (2001) (describing how nonmarketable securities are
valued through incorporation of discount); Eisenhofer & Reed, supra note 48, at 128 (describing need
for marketability discounts for nonmarketable securities). Restricted securities cannot be sold or
otherwise traded, but such formal barriers are not the primary concern herein. Rather, whenever a
market is absent, liquidity is lacking. Even if one can dispose of a security in a one-on-one transaction,
this constitutes only one half of the meaning of liquidity as price resiliency cannot exist in such a
transaction. One-on-one transactions thus do not constitute a market at all, let alone a liquid one. See
Economides, supra note 24, at 91 ("Liquidity plays a crucial role in financial exchange markets.
Without the availability of counteroffers, markets cease to exist, and they are replaced by individualized
bilateral contracts. Thus, some liquidity is necessary even for the existence of a financial exchange
market.") (emphasis in original).
69. The implications of time should also be noted. The proportion of liquidity or network value
in an equity security (and hence the welfare and legal implications of any network effects that may
exist), declines as the relevant transaction date moves farther into the future, and the present value of
that transaction accordingly declines (while the most likely such transaction might be trade or sale,
other events, including the use of the asset as a security, as by mortgaging my home, may have similar
implications). Cf KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 21, at 234 (noting increased impact of interest rate
adjustments, depending on length of time to maturity). Thus, as one is more of an investor, and less of
a trader, the proportion of network to inherent value in one's portfolio falls. Famed investor Warren
Buffett, adopting a buy-and-hold strategy, derives proportionately less value from the liquidity of his
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Ultimately, however, these exceptions prove the rule. For most equity
securities, the network value of liquidity is a significant component of
composite value. 70 Dispersed ownership remains the norm, and recurring
dividends account for a limited portion of the expected return on most
equities. 7 1 Meanwhile, the buy-and-hold lessons of modern finance have
generally not trickled down: Most investors continue to trade relatively
actively. 72 Given as much, strong network effects-and consequently
broader welfare and legal implications-can be predicted in equity
securities markets.73
II. WHY LAW MATTERS: THE NETWORK BARRIER TO MARKET
TRANSITION
What does the proposed network model of securities markets teach as
to why law might matter in Russia's creation of new markets? In the face
of this model, can an assumption of securities markets' spontaneous
emergence be sustained? In this Section, I will argue that network
economies in securities markets produce a series of dynamic effects, which
portfolio, and more from its inherent value. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Essays of Warren
Buffet: Lessons for Corporate America, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 5, 89 (1997) (describing Buffett's
investment strategy); Deborah A. DeMott, Agency Principles and Large Block Shareholders, 19
CARDOZO L. REV. 321 (1997) (noting that Berkshire Hathaway is a holding company that invests in
large blocks of public companies). Such a strategy, it therefore bears noting, will necessarily diminish
the welfare implications of network effects in securities markets.
Even for Buffett, however, network value remains significant. A large part of his gains
remain unrealized until he is actually able to trade his holdings-into a liquid market. If he cannot do
so efficiently-if liquidity is lacking-his shares necessarily give up some part of their value. (Besides
the caveat of dividends, noted above, this statement is cabined by the fact that even an illiquid equity
may be valuable as collateral or other form of security. It is further limited by the possibility that
Buffett also bought in an illiquid market, and hence received an up-front (il)liquidity discount.) Yet
Buffett might still do well if the inherent value of his portfolio were sufficiently high to compensate for
its illiquidity. In particular, a collection of equities that pays out regular and substantial dividends
might retain substantial value even absent liquidity. In that case, the inherent value of holding the stock
is greater and may compensate for any diminished network value.
70. This may actually be true of most financial exchange instruments, though clearly not every
one. Where it is not true, of course, network effects will be correspondingly weaker.
71.
See supra note 69.
72. See id.
73. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 7, at 592. Lemley and McGowan argue that:
Network theory implies that strong network markets will tend to 'tip' to a standard technology
because a large portion of the value of goods in such markets is, by definition, to
communicate with others who own the standard as well or to interoperate with goods
compatible with the standard. The relatively high network value and low inherent value of
such goods implies that, once consumers perceive that a de facto standard has been
established, tipping will occur very quickly.
Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Could Java Change Everything? The Competitive Propriety of a
Proprietary Standard, 1998 ANTITRUST BULL. 715, 721. See also Economides, Impact of the Internet,
supra note 33, at 10 (noting "strong network effects" in "financial exchange markets").
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can be loosely categorized under the twin headings of 'size effects' and
'tipping effects.' 74 As I will suggest with particular reference to the several
market formation choices noted at the outset,75 these phenomena-and the
sometimes severe, sometimes mild, market failures that follow from
them-may stymie efficient transition in network industries, including
equities markets.76
A. SIZE EFFECTS
A preliminary set of network-related obstacles to the efficient
emergence of securities markets turns on positive externalities in network
economies. These inefficiencies, which I characterize as size effects,
underutilization,
market
of market
include the possibilities
misidentification, and technological failure.
Network effects have been characterized as "positive externalities on
the demand side." 77
Less commonly highlighted than negative
78
externalities, which arise when costs go uninternalized by a producer,
74. See Gregory J. Werden, Network Effects and Conditions of Entry: Lessons from the
Microsoft Case, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 87, 89-92 (2001) (discussing two efficiency concerns relating to
network industries-size and tipping).
75. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
76. The term "market failure," and particularly the notion of network inefficiency, have a very
specific connotation as used herein. The relevant market failure and inefficiency in network industries
need not mean that markets are less efficient because network effects are present. To the contrary, they
may be far more efficient. In the circumstances below, however, they may be less efficient than they
otherwise might be. Network inefficiency as used herein might therefore be better characterized as
network sub-efficiency.
77. See Stefan Voigt & Hella Engerer, Institutions and Transformation-Possible Policy
Implications of the New Institutional Economics, in FRONTIERS IN ECONOMICS 131, 139 (Klaus F.
Zimmermann ed., 2002). See also Kolasky, supra note 39, at 579-80 (explaining that network effects
are often referred to as "positive network externalities" because each additional user adds value to the
network). Some legal analysis actually evaluates what economics would characterize as network
effects under the heading of "positive externalities." See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory
Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1567-69 (1989) (highlighting positive
externalities of standardization as grounds for federalizing corporate governance terms). Network
effects and positive externalities are not synonymous, however, notwithstanding such parallels. Most
positive externalities are not network effects. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 7, at 594-95
(discussing difference between network effects and economies of scale). On the other hand, all network
effects have some positive third-party utility implications.
78. The classic externality is the steel mill that drops soot on the neighboring laundromat. See
HAROLD DEMSETZ, OWNERSHIP, CONTROL, AND THE FIRM 13 (1988). As originally analyzed by
Marshall and Pigou, externalities were of relatively little consequence, as they focused on pecuniary
externalities, which operated through the price mechanism. This can be contrasted with so-called
technological externalities, which are commonly intended by the term externality today. See Macaulay,
supra note 49, at 379-81. Notably, however, even pecuniary externalities may have welfare
Laffont,
consequences, when prices play a role besides equalizing supply and demand. See J.J.
Externalities, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE-A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 264 (John Eatwell, Murray
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positive externalities arise when benefits remain uninternalized. 79 The
paradigmatic example of such positive externalities, though an empirically
flawed one, is beekeeping, which serves to pollinate the flowers and crops
of neighboring residents and farmers.8" Here, "social marginal benefits
exceed private marginal benefits,"8 1 and beekeeping may be inefficiently
underpursued.8 2
Network economies, whether in telephones, personal computer
operating systems, or stock markets, produce just such third party
benefits. 83 Thus, whether I purchase an Apple computer or Apple stock, I
enhance the utility of other members of the relevant network-increasing
84
software availability for computer users and liquidity for stockholders.
Milgate & Peter Newman eds., 1987) [hereinafter DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS]. In securities markets,
of course, they convey information.
79. See B. Peter Pashigian & Eric D. Gould, InternalizingExternalities: The Pricingof Space in
Shopping Malls, 41 J.L. & ECON. 115 (1998) (analyzing positive externalities arising from anchor
stores in malls); Jeffrey Standen, The Exclusionary Rule and Damages: An Economic Comparison of
Private Remedies for UnconstitutionalPolice Conduct, 2000 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1443, 1459-62 (2000)
(discussing the exclusionary rule as a source of positive externalities). Most applicably in the present
context, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failureand the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure
System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 725 (1984) (discussing positive externalities arising from harmonization of
disclosure standards). See also Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable
Limits on State Competition in CorporateLaw, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1485-86 (1992) (discussing
the ways in which state charter competition leads to socially undesirable externalities).
80. See Steven N.S. Cheung, The Fable of the Bees: An Economic Investigation, 16 J.L. & ECON.
11, 19-22 (1973) (describing and refuting potential positive externalities of beekeeping); Kenneth G.
Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 1, 8 n.38 (discussiig symbiotic relationship between apple grower and neighboring beekeeper).
81.
See Economides, supra note 30, at 89 ("The benefits of the addition of an extra node (or an
extra customer) exceed the private benefits accruing to the particular node (or customer)."); Michael L.
Katz & Carl Shapiro, S ,stems Competition and Network Effects, J. ECON. PERSP., Spr. 1994, at 93, 96;
Standen, supra note 79, at 1447-48 (positive externalities arise where "the utility from the good is
distributed to a diffused group and not captured by one person").
82. See Standen, supra note 79, at 1447-48 (noting potential for under-production of desired
good, with positive externalities). See also DEMSETZ, supra note 78, at 35.
83. Cf Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of
Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 697, 700-01 (1984) (articulating "third party effects" rationale for
mandatory securities disclosure).
84. Economides offers a possible explanation for the perceived public character of certain
networks:
Financial markets also exhibit positive size externalities in the sense that the increasing size
(or thickness) of an exchange market increases the expected utility of all participants. Higher
participation of traders on both sides of the market (drawn from the same distribution)
decreases the variance of the expected market price and increases the expected utility of riskaverse traders. Ceteris paribus, higher liquidity increases traders' utility. Thus, financial
exchange markets also exhibit network externalities.
Economides, supra note 35, at 679-80. This may help explain the perceived public character of certain
networks.

See Graciela Chichilnisky, Introduction, in MARKETS, INFORMATION, AND UNCERTAINTY,

supra note 1, at 16. Examples include the telephone network, the internet, and even the Windows
desktop. See also Standen, supra note 79, at 1448 ("A positive externality is thus tantamount to a
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Such external benefits, however, do not alone produce network
externalities. 85
Rather, externalities arise only where the relevant
86
producer/actor is unable to internalize fully the gains of their trade.
In securities markets, such internalization of the network gains that
87
accrue from the appearance of additional traders (as well as issuers)
would appear to be difficult, and externalities therefore likely. The
challenge of quantifying, or even identifying, network gains from improved
price discovery is illustrative. Closer price approximation of equilibrium
value clearly benefits those who trade in a stock. Yet improved price
information will also cause some traders to efficiently decline to purchase
the stock. The beneficiaries of greater network size and consequently
improved price discovery therefore include not only those who elect to
purchase an efficiently priced security, but anyone who considers doing
so. 88 Nor can mechanisms of ownership be relied upon as a remedy. As
public good."). Most significantly for our purposes, stock markets have long been viewed as quasipublic institutions. See James L. Chochrane, Brian McNamara, James E. Shapiro & Michael J. Simon,
The Structure and Regulation of the New York Stock Exchange, 18 J. CORP. L. 57, 58 (1993)
(describing NYSE as structured for public customers).
The efficiency of the market is necessary to increase savings, to protect them and, finally, to
expand production and employment. Thus, 'social' market utility cannot be measured only
by the profits of the stock exchange company because there is not necessarily a direct
correspondence between cost and (social) revenues, given the 'social' service of the market.
Di Noia, supra note 31, at 48.
85. See Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation, 2
THEORETICAL INQUIRES L. 387, 514-15 (2001) (stating that network effects are not necessarily an
externality, but a factor in preventing inefficient networks from being replaced by efficient networks).
Thus, although the reference to "network externalities" has become standard, along with the analogous
reference to "adoption externalities," proper usage is to "network effects." See Katz & Shapiro, supra
note 81, at 96. See also DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS, supra note 23, at 146 (discussing use of
term "externalities" in economics); Laffont, supra note 78, at 264; Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note
52, at 671.
86. See Niva Elkin-Koren & Eli M. Salzberger, Law and Economics in Cyberspace, 19 INT'L
REV. L. & ECON. 553, 563 (1999).
87. See supra note 42.
88.
Cf William J. Carney, Fundamental Corporate Changes, Minority Shareholders, and
Business Purposes, 1980 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 69, 75 (noting that "stock prices send signals about
management's performance to prospective bidders for control as well as to large shareholders who
might launch proxy fights"). The difficulties of identifying and quantifying network gains, for purposes
of internalization, are further compounded by public goods-style inefficiencies. Existing traders and
issuers can be expected to understate any benefit they derive from the public good of a larger network.
Given the cross-pollination effects noted above, moreover, improved valuation of any given stock
enhances the valuation of other securities, including most immediately those with similar levels of risk.
As such, purchasers (and potential purchasers) of a broad array of securities benefit from the arrival of
each additional trader and issuer, and the resulting network efficiencies. Efficient internalization of
such far-reaching externalities would seem unlikely.
This is not to suggest that compensation of new traders, and hence internalization of network
gains, is never possible. Even when it is, however, there are substantial transactions costs to be
accounted for. Thus, the internalization costs of positive externalities track those of (more familiar)
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explained below, several factors in the nature of securities markets, and
especially those in transition, limit the efficacy of89 property rights, and
interests, as a mechanism of efficient internalization.
If network externalities therefore exist in securities markets, what
potential inefficiencies may follow from them and suggest some role for
law? At least three can be cited: market underutilization, market
misidentification, and technological failure.
Most apparent are issues of network underutilization. Network
externalities in telephony, which prevent consumers' internalization of the
social benefit of their telephone purchases, can be expected to produce a
less than optimal number of telephone users. 90 In securities markets,
similarly, fewer traders will come to market than would be socially
optimal, as long as the private gain from market participation lags the
social gain. 9' Yet successful securities market creation likely requires
some critical mass of support and engagement. In developing country
transition, if market participation is insufficient, it may be impossible for
vigorous securities markets to develop, let alone provide efficient liquidity
and price discovery. Securities markets may be weak or may not even
92
appear.

negative externalities, in which costs are imposed on a disperse group. See Israel Gilead, Tort Law and
Internalization: The Gap Between Private Loss and Social Cost, 17 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 589, 602
(1997) (describing difficulty of internalizing positive externalities). Even with environmental
regulations, internalization is not impossible; it simply involves massive transactions costs. See Charles
J. Walsh & Philip A. Bramson, ECRA: Triggering the Internalization of the Social Costs of Hazardous
Wastes, 1990 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 415, 417-20. See also Coase, supra note 4, at 19-28 (suggesting
lack of clear entitlements enhance this basic difficulty). Ultimately, whether internalization is ever
that
possible is not the relevant question. The essential point is that where it is not possible, as it likely is
not with at least some network externalities in securities markets, market failure may occur. Hence the
essential need for empirical evaluation of whether network effects exist in any given case, and how
strong they are. See Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 37, at 146.
89. See infra notes 264-272 and accompanying text.
90. See Katz & Shapiro, supra note 81, at 96 ("the equilibrium network size is smaller than the
socially optimal network size, and the perfectly competitive equilibrium is not efficient"). See also id.
at 100 ("hardware/software networks ... are susceptible to under-utilization"); Liebowitz & Margolis,
supra note 52, at 672. As described below, this result may not always be avoided through direct or
indirect subsidies paid by network owners or members. See infra Part III.C.
91. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 7, at 497 (discussing risk of suboptimal network size
arising from inability of users to compensate prospective users for incremental value they add to
network). A distinct, but related issue is monopoly pricing in network markets. With network effects,
if one network/standard prevails, as would be expected, the resulting monopolist is likely to price access
higher than the efficient price that would draw the maximum number of consumers. Such pricing,
though not a positive externality, is similar in effect, in that it produces a sub-optimally sized network,
accentuating the dead-weight social loss. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 7, at 515-16.
92. See id.
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Network effects thus may stymie securities market development from
the very outset. The initial challenge in Russia and other emerging markets
is to determine the place of public securities markets in their economic
structure. 93 At this preliminary stage, market underutilization may produce
an inefficient preference for bank financing arrangements, as it actually has
in Russia. 94 To similar effect, early underutilization may predetermine
reliance on offshore equities markets, even in those nations that favor
equities markets. 95
Beyond these initial hurdles, network underutilization can also be
expected to influence the choice of an order- or quote-driven system of
trade, 96 and the identification of a cross-market linkage system. In the
former case, for example, network-related underutilization may favor the
trading model that can best operate with inefficiently diminished trading
volumes, regardless of its efficiency otherwise.

93. Specifically, countries must elect to rely on stock markets or bank financing as the primary
source of capital for growing companies. See Black, supra note 5, at 831 (describing alternative
corporate finance arrangements).
94. For the most part, Russian enterprise has looked not to public securities markets but to
commercial banking structures for capital financing. See Patricia A. McCoy, Levers of Law Reform:
Public Goods & Russian Banking, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 45, 79-82 (1997). Given the transitional
needs of Russia's corporations and the further need to nurture small enterprises, however, bank
financing may be an imperfect alternative. Banks' conservative lending practices and intrusive exercise
of control over dependent firms may not induce necessary industrial growth and development. See
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Governance and Commercial Banking: A
Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan, and the United States, 48 STAN. L. REV. 73, 96-97
(1995) (challenging efficiency of German and Japanese bank-dominated system). See also J. Robert
Brown, Jr., Of Brokers, Banks and the Case for Regulatory Intervention in the Russian Securities
Markets, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 185, 220 (1996) (noting the failings of German and Japanese bankdominated financing systems and the implications of such a model for Russia). Of course, this view is
not uncontested. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in CorporateStructure in Germany, Japan,
& the United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927 (1993). Given the early state of Russian market development,
bank financing may enjoy certain advantages. For present purposes, however, it is sufficient to rely on
recent empirical evidence correlating capital market development with economic growth rates, see
supra note 10, to conclude that strong securities markets, whether substitutes or supplements, would
further Russia's economic development.
95.
Compare Ross P. Buckley, A Tale of Two Crises: The Search for the Enduring Reforms of
the International Financial System, 6 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 1, 40 (2001) (describing
benefits of local capital markets), with John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Toward the Top?: The Impact of
Cross-Listingsand Stock Market Competition on InternationalCorporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 1757, 1802-03 (2002) (highlighting weaknesses and questionable long-term prospects of
transitional stock markets). See also Andrew T. Guzman, Capital Market Regulation in Developing
Countries:A Proposal, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 607, 609-11 (1999).
96. See Roberta S. Karmel, Turning Seats into Shares: Causes & Implications of
Demutualization of Stock and Futures Exchanges, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 367, 371 (2002). See also Reena
Aggarwal & James J. Angel, The Rise and Fall of the Amex Emerging Company Marketplace, 52 J. FIN.
ECON. 257. 271-72 (1999).
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Notably, a pattern of network underutilization accurately captures
Russia's perennially fragmented and undersized securities markets, which
have generally fallen far short of Russia's capital needs. 97 Even at its peak,
capitalization of the major Russian securities market amounted to only
$130 billion. 98 While they have persisted, Russian securities markets have
remained tiny. 99 Instead, corporate financing has been provided through
the inefficient universal banking arrangements of Russia's FinancialIndustrial Groups ("FIG").100
The second potential consequence of network externalities in
securities markets is that traders and issuers may end up on the wrong
market. In essence, because of the failure to fully compensate new traders
for the social utility they create, traders may not be efficiently induced to
join the market that will produce the highest social gain. Instead, another
potential market, though producing diminished public utility, may provide
greater individual utility, whether in the form of side payments or
otherwise. In this scenario, traders, and issuers as well, may wind up on
pareto suboptimal markets.
In Russia, during the explosive establishment of equities exchanges in
the early 1990s 0 1 -most of miniscule proportions10 2 and trading only in

97. See Andrei A. Baev, Implications of Emerging Legal Structures for Capital Markets in
Russia, 2 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 211, 216-17 (1996) (discussing problems in Russia's emerging
capital markets); Brown, supra note 94, at 185 (stating that "[a] plethora of banks, brokers, and stock
exchanges sprang to life, most of which were undercapitalized, disorganized, and poorly policed"
immediately after privatization occured in Russia). Cf Frances H. Foster, Restitution of Expropriated
Property: Post-Soviet Lessons for Cuba, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 621, 648 (1996) (noting Baltic
states' scarce capital reserves and limited access to world markets).
98. See Fox & Heller, supra note 26, at 1721 (noting that peak capitalization of Russian markets
before 1998 collapse amounted to only $130 billion for 200 largest companies-less than that of Intel at
the time).
99. See TIMOTHY J. YEAGER, INSTITUTIONS, TRANSITION ECONOMIES, AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 83 (1999) ("Thus far stock markets in transition economies are small and illiquid. The
Czech Republic has the largest exchange relative to the size of its economy, but the turnover tends to be
low.").
100. See Voigt & Engerer, supra note 77, at 164 (characterizing FIGs as formal networks);
McCoy, supra note 94, at 79-82 (noting that corporate financing has been largely supplied by Russian
banking industry).
101. See Brown, supra note 94, at 185; Karen Halverson, Resolving Economic Disputes in
Russia's Market Economy, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 59, 87 n. 135 (1996) (noting that there were as many as
1,000 exchanges before contraction and specialization) (citing Russia: Milestones on the Capitalist
Road, EUROMONEY, July 19, 1994, at 34).
102. See J. Robert Brown, Jr., Orderfrom Disorder: The Development of the Russian Securities
Markets, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 509, 536 (1995) (noting lack of appreciable trading on exchanges).
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privatization vouchers] 03 -some hint of this pattern could be observed. A
handful of private exchanges, owned by well-financed entrepreneurs,
offered cash and other incentives to attract listings, traders, and investors.
As suggested by their rapid rise and fall, 10 4 however, there is little reason to
believe that these markets were socially optimal choices, or even minimally
105
efficient.
More generally, the network-related risk of wrong markets has the
potential to lead Russia and other transitional markets to an erroneous
choice of market type, selecting either an order- or quote-driven, and a
floor-based or electronic trading mechanism, where the alternative might
be preferable. 10 6 The early tendency toward fragmented floor-based
trading in Russia may be suggestive in this regard.0 7
A final by-product of network externalities in securities markets and
attendant size effects is technologically deficient markets.
Thus,
inadequate market participation may reduce technological sophistication,
essentially placing the most efficient technologies out of reach. Again,
Russian markets are suggestive with reference to the choice of floor-based
versus electronic trading, and the effective linkage of independent trading
sites. Until regulators' imprimatur of the electronic trading mechanism of
the Russian Trading System ("RTS"), as described below, Russia's equities
exchanges proved unwilling to invest any significant funds in necessary,
but costly, computerized trading and linkage technology. Rather, they
chose to operate as fragmented appendages of existing commodities
exchanges. 10 8 Even the RTS was technologically limited in the period
immediately following its creation. It was only with the provision of U.S.

103. See Anthony V. Raftopol, Russian Roulette: A TheoreticalAnalysis of Voucher Privatization
in Russia, II B.U. INT'L L.J. 435, 455-56 (1993) (describing trade of privatization vouchers on Russian
markets beginning in November 1992).
104. See Halverson, supra note 101, at 87 n.135 (describing contraction in number of exchanges).
105. Cf Brown, supra note 102, at 549 (noting that loose licensing requirements led to as many as
120 national stock exchanges).
106. See Aggarwal & Angel, supra note 96, at 272 (suggesting smaller firms would prefer a dealer
market); Craig Pirrong, Market Liquidity and Depth on Computerized and Open Outcry Trading
Systems: A Comparison of DTB and LIFFE Bund Contracts, 16 J. FUTURES MKTS. 519, 531-41 (1996)
(finding greater liquidity and depth on computerized trading system, even with less trading volume).
107. Russia's still strong tendency toward bank financing, over public securities markets, might
also be understood as a 'wrong market' issue of sorts. See supra note 100.
108. See Halverson, supra note 101, at 87-88 (describing development of Russia's exchanges,
beginning in 1990 with the Moscow Commodities Exchange). Cf Brown, supra note 102, at 535-36
(noting that most trades were not made in centralized markets but in over-the-counter markets). Such
arrangements might not, in any given situation, be inefficient. In this case, however, they were part of a
pattern of unwillingness to invest in structural improvements.
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technical assistance funds that RTS trading screens came to be widely
disseminated, and the system made operational.' 0 9
Even more important than their consequences for such initial
technology choice, network externalities may limit the willingness of
network owners to maintain, let alone upgrade, market infrastructure, as
some have observed in the United States." 0° This is most immediately a
question of adequate size. Again, a certain critical mass may be necessary
to finance maintenance and improvement of market technologies. In
addition, however, if multiple owners exercise dominion over segments of
the entire network (or market), each owner's inability to reap the full social
gain of their innovations will limit their willingness to finance them, and
they will be underproduced.'' Consequently, centralized ownership or
control, or at least centralized coordination, may be necessary.'112
Both the size and ownership dimensions of such network-driven
resistance to infrastructure maintenance and development can also be
expected to shape the emergence of a network-efficient linkage among
trading sites. Given the substantial costs of such technology, relatively
high, if not universal, participation is likely to be essential to its emergence.
By the same token, substantial positive externalities running to co-owners
of the components of any network linkage will likely overwhelm any
incentive that might otherwise favor investment in such linkages. 113

109. Cf Mikhail Ratinov, Investing in Russian Securities: Analysis of Capital Market
Development, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1772, 1790 (1998) (describing sluggish development of Russian
market, despite inflow of technical assistance funds).
110. See Morris Mendelson & Junius W. Peake, Intermediaries or Investors: Whose Market is it
Anyway?, 19 J. CORP. L. 443, 447 (1994). Cf Gerald T. Nowak, Note, A Failure of Communication:
An Argument for the Closing of the NYSE Floor, 26 MICH. J.L. REFORM 485, 524 n.192 (1993) (noting
that NYSE might become a museum of bygone technology, while other exchanges, such as Tokyo,
London, and Toronto, dominate international securities trading). The transitional inefficiencies
attendant to network externalities are not, as this example makes clear, unique to emerging markets.
They may similarly interfere with securities market innovation in developed economies. Cf Klausner,
supra note 38, at 850 n.283 (noting that Delaware, with its strong lead in corporate chartering, "has
often responded to other states' innovations, [but] has generally not been an innovator"). The ill
consequences of network externalities in established securities markets may, in fact, be greater than in
emerging markets. New market mechanisms may require even greater market support and engagement
in established markets if they are to effectively compete with long-standing arrangements, which,
however inefficient they may be, are familiar and reliable.
111. See Frischmann, supra note 39, at 34 (discussing reluctance of private investors to sink high
fixed costs unless beneficiaries contribute to cost recovery).
112. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 7, at 560 (noting potential need for centralized
ownership or coordination).
113. The impact of network externalities in any given case may well be small. Cumulatively,
however, the inefficiencies that result have the potential to substantially reduce net social welfare, see
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TIPPING EFFECTS

A further set of network implications for securities market transition
can be grouped under the heading of "tipping effects." 14 Arising from the
winner-take-all character of network competition, 115 the latter are likely to
be of greater ultimate consequence for market creation than the size effects
described above." 6 Tipping thus creates the peculiar paradox of network
industries, in which standardization is at once efficient, but resisted." 7
Because of the countervailing implications of market tipping in
network industries, strong markets may fail to emerge, at least in a timely
fashion, absent some function of law. 1 8 From the outset, thus, domestic
Katz & Shapiro, supra note 81, at 96, and to delay or prevent efficient market creation and
restructuring.
114. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 7, at 496-97. Besen and Farrell characterize network
markets as "tippy," such that "the coexistence of incompatible products may be unstable, with a single
winning standard dominating the market." Stanley M. Besen & Joseph Farrell, Choosing How to
Compete: Strategies and Tactics in Standardization,J. ECON. PERSP., Spr. 1994, at 117, 118. See also
Katz & Shapiro, supra note 81, at 105-06 ("Because of the strong positive-feedback elements, systems
markets are especially prone to 'tipping,' which is the tendency of one system to pull away from its
rivals in popularity once it has gained an initial edge."). Economides refers to this as the selfreinforcing nature of networks. See, e.g., Economides, supra note 30, at 92.
115. See Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 7, at 5. See also Di Noia, supra note 31, at 42 ("When
exchanges are not interconnected (the incompatible case), only pure-coiner solutions in equilibrium
may arise, with only one exchange surviving."); Economides, The Impact of the Internet,supra note 33,
at 10.
116. See Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 52, at 672 ("Concern about marginal adjustment of the
level of network activity has not been the primary focus of network externality modeling; it has
focused, instead, primarily on selection among competing networks."). Liebowitz and Margolis,
however, argue that size effects are the only important network effects. See id.
117. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 7, at 506, 510 (highlighting benefits of standardization
in network industry). But see Domowitz, supra note 33, at 164 ("The result is that the market as a
whole is biased against standardization in the presence of competing exchange services technologies.").
As described above, network effects in securities markets arise from the efficiency gains produced by
new participants, and the corresponding inefficiency attendant to fragmented markets. Again, telephone
networks are instructive: All users should likely be on a single network; at a minimum, they should
converge to a limited number of large networks. Network effects hence encourage interoperability,
whether by means of standardization or compatibility. See Katz & Shapiro, supra note 81, at 105 ("In
markets with network effects, there is [a] natural tendency toward de facto standardization, which
means everyone using the same system.").
118. See Katz & Shapiro, supra note 81, at 94 (discussing importance of coordination in network
industries). Debt securities are less commonly traded than equities, provide a consistent and reliable
cash flow, and have a maturity date on which they are subject to redemption. Given these features, they
can be expected to enjoy more limited liquidity value, see John C. Coffee, Jr. & William A. Klein,
Bondholder Coercion: The Problem of Constrained Choice in Debt Tender Offers and
Recapitalizations,58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1207, 1217 (1991), and greater consumption value-in network
terms, the ratio of network to inherent value of bonds is likely to be lower than that of stocks.
Consequently, network effects in bonds are likely to be weaker, reducing resistance to entry and
permitting debt markets to emerge more readily. Evidence to this effect may be suggested by the
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public securities markets may prove unable to establish themselves, given
strong banks on the one hand, and attractive offshore capital markets on the
other." 9 Tipping effects are likely to have even clearer implications,
however, for the intertwined choices of a quote- or order-driven trading
model and a floor-based or electronic trading system. 12 ° Most dramatic,
finally, may be the tipping effect implications for emerging markets' choice
of a particular (and singular) trading linkage system. Captured by
21
economists as issues of "expectations, coordination, and compatibility,"'
tipping effects' implications for these several choices are central to network
effects' legal implications for securities market transition.
1. Tipping as a Barrier to Entry in Market Transition
One can begin to appreciate the phenomenon of market tipping by
considering how a trade linkage system designed to capture the network
intermarket
consolidation-through
of
market
efficiencies
2
2
communication-might actually develop. 1 In essence, one would expect
competitors to emerge with alternative communications systems directed to
the information sharing and trading needs of an interlinked market. In
ordinary market competition, market share would ultimately be distributed
among such competitors, such that even the least successful could recoup
their sunk costs. 123 In the presence of network effects, however, the winner
takes all.' 24 The sponsor of the prevailing standard secures not only the

tendency of debt markets to appear more quickly than equities markets in emerging economies,
including Russia. See Yeager, supra note 99, at 83.
119. See Coffee, supra note 95, at 1802-03.
120. This choice, it bears noting, may potentially have significant welfare implications, if a dealer
versus an auction market, for example, would be pareto optimal, either generally or in a particular case.
See Borrelli, supra note 10, at 895-97. See also Aggarwal & Angel, supra note 96, at 272; Pirrong,
supra note 106, at 541.
121. See Katz & Shapiro, supra note 81, at 95. See also Di Noia, supra note 31, at 52 ("Thus, the
essential relationship between the components of a network are complementarity, compatibility, and
coordination.").
122. Characterizing the mechanisms by which information is collected and disseminated as valueadded networks, Heal suggests that they themselves exhibit a "critical mass" phenomenon (i.e., network
effects). See Geoffrey Heal, Price and Market Share Dynamics in Network Industries, in MARKETS,
INFORMATION, AND UNCERTAINTY, supra note 1,at 191. In reality, however, it is the underlying
market that is network driven.
123. See William J. Baumol, Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, Parity Pricing and Its
Critics: A Necessary Conditionfor Efficiency in the Provision of Bottleneck Services to Competitors, 14
YALE J. ON REG. 145, 160 (1997) (noting that in competitive market, forces of competition will lead to
price that returns to each firm cost incurred in supplying product and return to investors on outlay).
124. "ISlince systems competition is prone to tipping, there are likely to be strong winners and
strong losers under incompatibility." Katz & Shapiro, supra note 81, at 11l.See Jonathan B. Baker,
Promoting Innovation Competition Through the Aspen/Kodak Rule, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 495, 497
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value of its own contribution, but the full value of the market for which it

has set the standard. 125 Conversely, even a reliable, efficient, and effective
competitor quickly finds itself with little or no market share. 126 Even were
it to cut costs, or otherwise increase its efficiency, it would have little
27
prospect of gaining such market share. 1
In essence, network competition is characterized by rapid and

substantial shifts in favor of one, prevailing party.' 28 This tendency arises
from the importance of network size to the value of network goods. In
network industries, individual consumers have strong rational incentives to
shift to the network that is presently largest and, even more importantly,

that has the greatest future upside-without significant regard to its
freestanding (that is, inherent) utility, or even its potentially greater cost.
The network benefits arising from greater size more than compensate for
such deficiencies. One can readily see, however, why such a tendency
would snowball, with more users (and hence greater network size)
attracting even more users, at an even faster rate.

n.l (1999) ("Network externalities tend to generate a winner-take-all competition in which the market
'tips' to favor one firm.") (citing CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES 176 (1999)).
125.
See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 7, at 515; Werden, supra note 74, at 91 ("If network
effects are particularly pronounced, competition may be essentially 'for the market,' rather than 'in the
market."'). With this result, of course, monopoly rents can also be predicted.
126.
See Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 7, at 10 (noting that network industry participants "are
competing not just for market share, but for commercial viability and the market itself").
127.
See Baumol et al., supra note 123, at 160 (acknowledging inability of competitors to recover
sunk costs in network industries); Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 7, at 9. Entry is not impossible, of
course, but the new technology must provide more than a marginal improvement in quality, or reduction
in cost. See Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 7, at 9. If it does, however, it may be able to "leapfrog" the
dominant network. See id.
128.
See Mark Geier, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 297, 302 (2001)
("Markets characterized by [network] effects tend to 'tip' because once a firm reaches a certain market
share, network effects will help to push its share towards one hundred percent."); Katz & Shapiro, supra
note 81, at 105-06; Lemley & McGowan, supra note 7, at 582 (highlighting that market shift occurs
rapidly once standard has been established); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., An Antitrust Remedy or Monopoly
Leveraging by Electronic Networks, 93 Nw. U.L. REV. 1, 17-18 (1998) (noting rapid acceptance of
Windows as dominant operating platform, once it was determined that it would prevail over
competitors). See also Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative
Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 21 (1998) (suggesting presence of "tipping effect" when people sense
history is being made). The rapidity of market tipping in networked securities markets is suggested by
the competition for German bund contracts between the London International Financial Futures &
Options Exchanges (LIFFE) and German-based Eurex (formerly DTB). In little more than a year, bund
futures went from being the top contract on LIFFE to being suspended from trade-for lack of
liquidity-after Eurex's capture of nearly the entire market in the contracts. See LIFFE's Problems...
and Solutions, FUTURES, Sept. 1998, at 82; Finance and Economics: LIFFE Alone, ECONOMIST, July
25, 1998, at 70. See also Pirrong, supra note 106, at 531-41 (describing slightly superior liquidity and
depth of smaller DTB market in early 1990s, before market share tipped from LIFFE to DTB).
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This can be seen in the network competition between VHS and
Betamax standards. 129 Faced with some pattern of shift toward VHS,
increasing numbers of consumers selected VHS. Rather than some division
of market share among them, consequently, the conclusion of the network
competition in VCR formats was the disappearance of Betamax from the
market. 3 ° The Bell Telephone monopoly similarly emerged as the winner
of a network competition among alternative systems, the balance of which
have been lost to history. 3 ' Perhaps most relevant to the potential for
tipping in emerging securities markets, however, is eBay's near complete
dominance of the Internet auction market. In that case, Internet shoppers
have dramatically exhibited the network tendency to go where everyone
else is going, producing eBay's dominant market share.
While not unexpected in the face of natural monopoly-like network
effects, 132 this tendency has the potential to retard market development.
Most importantly, it may deter competitive entry. This arises from
133
potential expectations failures.
Issues of expectations are important in every market, but are
especially so in network industries. 134 For the reasons noted above, the
expectations of network market participants (or potential market
participants, in emerging markets) regarding the future size of any given
129. See Geier, supra note 128, at 297 ("Strong economies of scale and network effects lead to
markets dominated by one firm."). Cf Di Noia, supra note 31, at 46 (arguing that only one exchange,
and not necessarily the most efficient one, is likely to survive).
130. See Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 761,
823 n.271 (2002) (noting Betamax's loss to VHS). See also James Boyle, Intellectual Property Policy
Online: A Young Person'sGuide, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 47, 50 (1996) (arguing that market may tip in
favor of one standard, such as VHS, and against another, such as Betamax).
131.
Cf Bruce Abramson, Promoting Innovation in the Software Industry: A First Principles
Approach to Intellectual Property Reform, 8 B.U. J. SCa. & TECH. L. 75, 141 (2002) ("The network
nature of the platform market suggests that this situation is unstable. Eventually, users would tip the
market towards one platform that would become a defacto standard.") (emphasis in original); id. at 141
n.255 ("Tipping to a standard was inevitable.").
132. While potentially producing similar results as network effects, natural monopolies are a
fundamentally different, and much better understood, economic phenomenon. Both will often arise
from scale economies. In the case of natural monopolies of scale (as distinct from those arising from
inelastic demand, coupled with high barriers to entry), the relevant scale economy is supply-side:
"[Miarginal and average costs of production decline throughout the demand curve." Lemley &
McGowan, supra note 7, at 484. With network effects, on the other hand, the demand curve is shaped
by increasing demand. See id.
133. See Pirrong, supra note 34, at 155 n.24 (describing network barriers to entry by traders).
134. See Katz & Shapiro, supra note 81, at 93-94; Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 38, at 112
("In general, entrepreneurs can help shape users' expectations by convincing potential users that a new
form is likely to become a standard. These expectations, in turn, determine whether users will adopt or
shun a new form."). See also Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-In Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L. REV.
813, 818-19 (1998); Warner, supra note 46, at 132-35.
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network are crucial. 135 Given a likely winner-take-all outcome, each
present or potential consumer/adopter must develop accurate expectations
as to the 'right' market-the one that will win any network competitionas this will determine whether he or she ends up in the market or excluded
from it.
The array of market actors in Russia, for example, from existing and
potential market sponsors and issuers, to individual market professionals
and investors, must develop expectations, at the outset, as to whether strong
public markets will even appear in Russia, or alternative arrangements
(e.g., bank financing) will suffice. 136 Further, they must predict whether
Russia will maintain its orientation toward a continental, order-driven
electronic trading model, 137 or fall back on the traditional exchange
auctions of the early days of its transition. Finally, they must adopt
expectations as to the fashion in which Russian securities markets are likely
to be linked into a common market, if they are to efficiently and effectively
participate in that market.
Such expectations are hard to develop, however, and prone to error.
Consequently, commitment of the initial investment to develop a new
network-whatever it might be-becomes a far more risky venture than
ordinary market entry.' 38 In this circumstance, even a far clearer and less
costly network technology (for example, a new telephone technology)
might go unintroduced, on account of the tipping effect risk that it might
39

not prevail. 1

This may be easiest to visualize in the standards context, where
network analysis is quite often brought to bear. Ordinarily, the emergence
135. See Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New Economy, 19
YALE J. ON REG. 171, 280 (2002) ("People concerned about lock-in will focus on the size of the
network that will exist in the future, not the size of the one that exists today."). See also Klausner,
supra note 38, at 779-80 (describing benefits that can accrue from future adoption of similar terms in
contracts). "When the good is durable, an individual's consumption benefits will depend on the future
size of the relevant network. Consumers will base their purchase decisions on expected network sizes."
Katz & Shapiro, supra note 38, at 426 (emphasis in original). See Domowitz, supra note 33, at 164
("Nascent mergers under the electronic umbrella will encourage traders to expect electronic market
structure to be dominant in the provision of exchange services. If traders expect this outcome, it will
indeed occur through individual adoption decisions.").
136. See Black, supra note 5, at 832-34 (describing advantages of public securities markets over
bank financing). See also Buckley, supra note 95, at 40.
137. See Poser, supra note 21, at 523.
138. See Katz & Shapiro, supra note 81, at 102 (citing "'chicken and egg' problem in launching a
new communications network").
139. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 7, at 503-04 (describing tipping effect barriers to entry
in network industries). See also Heal, supra note 122, at 213 ("The industry either takes off, and is
likely to be monopolized, or does not grow at all.").
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of a single, universal standard is most efficient and sustainable, given the
network-style compatibility gains that result. Given as much, however, one
may observe a rational hesitancy to enter and incur the costs of developing,
or possibly commercializing, a potential standard, for fear it will not be the
one to prevail. 140 In microeconomic terms, thus, tipping effects may
produce multiple fulfilled expectations equilibria, including the inefficient
prospect of no entry. 141

A prominent example of network effect barriers to entry in the
standards context is the continued absence of high-definition television
("HDTV") from the commercial marketplace, notwithstanding its technical
availability for more than a decade. 142 For the moment, potential producers
in Europe, Japan, and the United States continue to maintain distinct
technological standards. 143 In this situation, the risk of market tipping to a
competing standard remains substantial, and candidates to produce and
distribute the necessary hardware and software (i.e., programming) for

140. See Douglas D. Leeds, Raising the Standard: Antitrust Scrutiny of Standard-Setting
Consortia in High Technology Industries, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 641, 648
(1997) ("If the network externalities are strong, the consumer may choose to forego adopting the new
standard despite the new innovation. Recognizing this, firms would be less likely to invest in
innovation."). An intertwined phenomenon involves the creation of the compatible products necessary
to support any given standard. Thus, the success of an HDTV standard depends upon the willingness of
independent production companies to produce compatible programs. See Katz & Shapiro, supra note
81, at 94 ("A firm contemplating whether to develop and release a new architecture of microprocessor,
for example, must know whether software will be provided to work on the new microprocessor.").
141.
Economides has observed that:
In fact, it is not difficult to show that any size of participation is an equilibrium, including
zero participation. If everyone expected no one else to participate in the call, he would not
participate himself, and the market would not exist. Given the wide multiplicity of
expectations equilibria, it is clear that there is a need to create a specific mechanisn that can
support a single equilibrium of large participation.
Economides, supra note 24, at 92-93 (emphasis in original). See Katz & Shapiro, supra note 81, at 9697. Cf Di Noia, supra note 31, at 53 ("network externalities can lead to inefficient equilibria").
Coulson, Liang, and Wang point to an analogous pattern in labor markets. See N. Edward Coulson,
Derek Liang & Ping Wang, Spatial Mismatch in Search Equilibrium, 19 J. LABOR EcON. 949, 968
(2001) (noting that network externalities in labor markets permit multiple stable equilibria, including an
"equilibrium trap" of high unemployment).
142. See generally Joy R. Butler, HDTV Demystified: History, Regulatory Options, & the Role of
Telephone Companies, 6 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 155 (1992) (describing HDTV and its technological
underpinnings). The network character of HDTV is readily apparent. As with personal computer
operating systems, the scope of available 'software'-here, programming-as well as support services,
is essential to the utility, or even use, of HDTV hardware. In such circumstances, the arrival of
additional users of the technology can be expected to enhance the value of the network, and hence the
network hardware, to earlier purchasers-a standard network effect.
143. See id. at 158-64 (noting development of different HDTV standards in Europe, Japan, and
United States).
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HDTV are rationally hesitant to undertake the substantial costs of entry. 44
Some regulatory role in shaping a standard, as described in the following
section, may therefore be essential to the widespread commercialization of
145
HDTV technology.
In networked securities markets, therefore, where tipping means that
slight advantages will translate into "increasing volume inequality among
financial exchanges," 146 no potential sponsor may be willing to incur the
substantial costs of developing the infrastructure of a new trading network,
14 7
for fear that its network may not win the ensuing standards competition.
In some industries, such a network barrier to entry might have limited
consequences. Where entry costs are substantial and variable costs limited,
however, as in. securities market infrastructure, network effects may be a
14
major obstacle to market entry. 8
144. See id. at 162 (highlighting risks and costs associated with development and marketing of
HDTV as discouraging individual companies from allocating significant resources towards its
development). See also Susan R. Athari, High Definition Television: A New Breed of Television Enters
the Regulatory Jungle, I COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 87, 90, 94, 97 (1993) (noting both producer and
consumer reticence to invest in HDTV technologies absent clearer indication of future demand). Cf
Butler, supra note 142, at 162 (noting that American antitrust laws prevent companies from sharing
risks and costs of development of HDTV); Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Standard Setting in HighDefinition Television, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 1, 26-27 (William C. Brainard

& George L. Perry eds., 1992).
145.

See MICHEL DUPAGNE & PETER B. SEEL, HIGH-DEFINITION TELEVISION: A GLOBAL

PERSPECTIVE 3-4 (1998). Law's domain in HDTV may even be international in scope, given the need
for coordination not only within, but among, states. See id.
146. Economides, Impact of the Internet, supra note 33, at 10. See Di Noia, supra note 31, at 5455 (noting tipping-style "exponential growth" in trading system membership and "tendency for order
flow to attract order flow").
147. See Di Noia, supra note 31, at 56 (reasoning that "the sunk costs of the in-place investment
force exchanges to keep their technology"). See also Economides & Siow, supra note 32, at 109 ("On
the other hand, liquidity is self-reinforcing. Given an existing market structure, new markets may find
it impossible to open because nobody wants to use a new market with low liquidity. There may be
fewer markets than is necessary for efficiency, and yet new markets will not open."); id. at Ill ("There
are many equilibria in this game, including quite unreasonable ones. For example, there is an
equilibrium in which everybody stays home because everyone expects all others to stay home.").
Conversely, tipping effects and the resulting potential for monopoly rents may produce just the opposite
result, excess entry, characterized by some as "insufficient friction." See Michael L. Katz & Carl
Shapiro, Product Introduction with Network Externalities, J. INDUS. ECON., Mar. 1992, at 55, 73. See
also infra Part II.B.2. In essence, network industries may exhibit a bias toward new technologies, even
where stranding of certain consumers produces a net social loss. See Katz & Shapiro, supra, at 73.
Oddly enough, then, size and tipping effects in network industries may produce a wide range of
potential inefficiencies, from no entry, to insufficient entry, to excess entry.
148. See Heal, supra note 122, at 192 (discussing importance of attracting "critical mass" in
networks characterized by large fixed costs and low variable costs).
[E]ven restricting attention to rational expectations equilibrium-which may strike many
people as already placing unjustified faith in the computational ability of consumers-still
allows multiple equilibria to occur. Sticking with the example of fax machine, clearly no
consumer would value owning the only fax machine in existence. If each consumer supposed
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This can be readily appreciated with reference to the network market
need to construct an effective communications linkage among competing
trading sites. Such a system, with its requirements of real time posting,
multiple relaying of trades, and extended reach, will necessarily involve
substantial sunk costs. With tipping effects, however, such costs may not
be subject to recovery, if a competing system (or standard) is ultimately
favored.
In Russia, to this effect, notwithstanding the existence of any number
of small- to medium-sized exchanges and a large number of brokers,14 9
none proved willing to take the initiative to develop a national-or even
moderately efficient-trading system in the early 1990s. 15 ° This was the
case notwithstanding quickly growing demand for capital and an essentially
open regulatory and competitive field. Not until the Federal Commission
on Securities Markets ("FCSM"), at the prompting of U.S.A.I.D. advisors,
brought together a handful of Russia's more established and trusted brokers
to form the self-regulatory organization NAUFOR was the process of
creating a common market structure set in motion.' 5 1 Until that time,
market participants faced substantial risks that no public securities markets
of any substance would emerge, and that even if they did, they might not be
compatible with their chosen trading model (for example, order- versus
52
quote-driven, and/or floor-based versus electronic).1
that no other consumer purchases a fax machine, then no one will purchase it, and there is a
fulfilled expectations equilibrium with no sales.
Katz & Shapiro, supra note 81, at 97. See also Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 37, at 144 ("The
representative network effects problem is this: Some action would be socially wealth increasing if
enough people joined in, but each agent finds that independent action is unattractive."). It bears
emphasizing that network markets will not invariably tip, but may do so, depending on an array of
factors, including the balance of network and inherent value in the given industry, and the resulting
capacity of competitors to tweak inherent value to maintain market share. For similar reasons, network
barriers to entry are simply possible welfare deficiencies in network industries, which may not arise in
many cases, if not most.
149. See Brown, supra note 94, at 185 (stating that privatization in Russia immediately caused
"plethora of banks, brokers, and stock exchanges [to spring] to life, most of which were
undercapitalized, disorganized, and poorly policed").
150.
See TIMOTHY FRYE, BROKERS AND BUREAUCRATS: BUILDING MARKET INSTITUTIONS IN
RUSSIA 48 (2000).
151.
Cf. FRYE, supra note 150, at 127. See generally Jacques de Lisle, Lex Americana?: United
States Legal Assistance, American Legal Models, and Legal Change in the Post-Communist World and
Beyond, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 179, 233 (1999) (describing U.S.A.I.D.'s role in establishment of
stock exchanges, securities and exchange commissions, and clearance and settlement organizations).
152.
See Poser, supra note 21, at 523 (noting problematic incompatibility of quote-driven
NASDAQ system with most European trading systems). It bears noting that even exchanges and

alternative trading systems not seeking to fill a network sponsorship role in the market face tipping
effect barriers to entry. Every trading system must make the difficult choice of which particular trading
network to link to, given the prospect that only one will come to dominate the market, if not survive.
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What progress has been made in Russian equities markets has thus
arisen from the government's facilitation of NAUFOR's creation of the
Russian Trading System ("RTS"). First coordinating the establishment of
NAUFOR, and then assisting in the development and implementation of
the RTS,153 the government essentially gave its imprimatur to NAUFOR
and the RTS, and thereby 'tipped' the market. In this way, it obviated
some part of the resistance to entry based on unresolved questions
concerning whether public securities markets would play any significant
role in the Russian economy, whether exchanges or electronic markets
would come to dominate, and how traders across Russia would be
effectively linked. Given market tipping, finally, it should come as no
surprise that RTS and its offshoots (including RTS-2) have since come to
154
dominate equities trading in Russia.

Furthermore, the same reticence to enter applies to traders, issuers, and the secondary service
providers that facilitate the securities markets' operation. "If the benefit of others' participation in the
market is gained only after these entries, then there could be an incentive for firms and intermediaries
not to enter and wait until the exchange grows to the point that their utility reachies] a certain level." Di
Noia, supra note 31, at 55 n.44 (emphasis in original). See also id. at 55 (noting that "liquidity attracts
liquidity"). Thus, assuming costs attendant to any decision by traders, issuers, and others to enter;
concomitant costs of exit (including development of expertise, nurturing of contacts, and choice of
location and equipment); and an inability to participate in multiple networks (that is, exclusivity), see
Lemley & McGowan, supra note 7, at 599 (noting importance of exclusivity in producing network
inefficiencies), which can functionally be assumed, to at least some degree, even in the case of traders,
who commonly direct their transactions to a single or small handful of potentially-available trading sites
(as with consumers of VCR's and computers, thus, traders could use multiple systems, but ordinarily do
not), these parties may also sit back and await the outcome of any inter-network competition. See Katz
& Shapiro, supra note 81, at 94.
To this effect, notwithstanding a fair amount of trading activity in Russia in the early 1990s,
the professional standards of Russia's brokers and dealers remained low. Cf Dimitri V. Ponomarev,
Self-Regulation of the Securities Market in Russia, in INVESTING IN RUSSIA'S SECURITIES MARKET: AN
INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE STATE OF PLAY 50-51 (1996) [hereinafter RUSSIA'S SECURIITES
MARKET] (noting broker-dealers' "refusal to enter organizations in late 1994 and early 1995,"
"followed by a complete, if temporary, assimilation" in 1995 and 1996). Potential market participants
may simply have been unwilling to commit the necessary resources to develop specialized skills, absent
greater clarity on the ultimate form of the market. Once NAUFOR was tapped as the major selfregulatory organization on Russia's equities markets, thus, the professionalism of brokers and dealers
began to improve. See FRYE, supra note 150, at 127-29. To similar effect, one might note Russian
corporate issuers' tendency to seek bank financing, or issue debt securities, rather than undertake to
designate a single listing site (and hence network), with its attendant risks.
153. See Natalia Gurushina, Regulating the Nascent Security Markets, 2 TRANSITION 34, 34 (Oct.
4, 1996) (describing RTS as "NASDAQ-type computer network set up by the Federal Commission on
Securities and the Capital Market").
154. See FRYE, supra note 150, at 132 (reasoning that "[albout one-half of all trades are formally
conducted through the RTS, but brokers note that price and counterparty information obtained through
the RTS is responsible for almost all trades"); Greg Lumelsky, Does Russia Need a Securities Law? 18
N.W.J. INT'L L. & BUs. 111, 152-54 (1997) (describing interrelated role of RTS and RTS-2 in Russian
equities trading). While emerging markets are emphasized herein, it should again be noted that even in
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2. Excess Entry and Inefficient Network Competition
Tipping effects in network markets may also have other problematic
implications for securities market transition. Even if potential network
sponsors can be convinced to enter, and to compete actively to establish a
securities market trading network, the resulting competition will be, in
some respects, inefficient.' 5 5 To begin with, network industries may
exhibit "insufficient friction," causing more competitors to enter than the
market can bear. 156 Additionally, first-order standards competition (i.e.,
competition to define the prevailing network) will often prove
economically wasteful, as compared with second-order, intrastandard
57
competition.'
Where excess returns are expected, as in winner-take-all network
competition, a competitive "fight" can be expected, which "fighting [will]
dissipate profits."' 158 The excess returns that follow standards competitions
thus encourage predatory practices and penetration pricing, among other
costly attempts to undermine competing products. 59 In the presence of
developed countries, new market mechanisms may not emerge in the face of network effect barriers to
entry. On this count, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's drive to create a National Market
System, based on the failure of U.S. markets to develop and adopt network communications systems
that would allow broader collection and dissemination of trading information, might be highlighted.
See infra note 193. Given the regulatory complexity of the National Market System, moreover, it might
even be concluded that network-driven market tipping is an even higher barrier to market restructuring
than market creation, given the greater network lock-in enjoyed by existing systems.
155. See Joseph F. Brodley & Ching-to Albert Ma, Contract Penalties, Monopolizing Strategies,
and Antitrust Policy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1173 (1993) ("If two or more equally efficient entrants
enter the market simultaneously, it appears that the entrants will earn no economic profit because
competition between the entrants will lower price to the entrants' marginal cost."); Katz & Shapiro,
supra note 81, at 107 (describing "especially intense" competition in network industries until a clear
winner is determined).
156. See supra note 147.
157. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 7, at 495 (highlighting potential for inefficient
competitive strategies, where firms seek to "establish their own products as standards on which
competition in the market, or in after-markets for complementary goods, will be based": "Because the
returns to the standards winner will be higher than in 'normal' markets, relatively risky strategies, such
as predation or, at a minimum, penetration pricing, might be rational in a networks market."). But see
Klock, supra note 20, at 773-74.
158. See Besen & Farrell, supra note 114, at 118 ("The more skewed are the returns, the harder
the firms will fight; and the sharper the available tactics the more the fighting will dissipate profits.").
Besen and Farrell note, however, that this will not occur in all circumstances. See id. at 120-21 ("Price
competition is more intense when vendor's products are compatible.").
159. See Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley & Michael H. Riordan, Predatory Pricing: Strategic
Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L.J. 2239, 2241 (2000) (noting that modern economic analysis
recognizes that predatory pricing conduct may, in fact, be rational under select circumstances). But see
Katz & Shapiro, supra note 81, at 107 (noting that firm's "market dominance" does not inherently mean
that it is experiencing "super-normal profits" that would render it susceptible to promotional strategies
by new entrants).
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network effects, such inefficiently aggressive pricing and similar
competitive strategies may be rational, given the supercompetitive returns
to be garnered by the victor. 16° Competition among securities market
16 1
trading networks may therefore be an inefficient use of resources.
Instead, it would be preferable for such competition to occur in the second162
order, with competition over price within the network.
Of course, network competition is not always inefficient. Rather, it
163
may sometimes identify the optimal network in a cost-efficient manner.
At least sometimes in the presence of network effects, however, it may
prove gravely inefficient. Until the establishment of the RTS, costly
competition among an array of Russian exchanges was the norm.
Notwithstanding the stakes, however, this competition did not produce any
substantial advances in the market's development. Rather, several years of
this pattern came to a close with no dramatic market growth-either by any
1 64
individual exchange or by the collection of them.
Notably, just such concerns with inefficient competition helped
motivate the attempt to create a National Market System in the United

160. See Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 7, at 10 (network industry participants "are competing not
just for market share, but for commercial viability and the market itself'). Notably, similar competitive
behavior can be expected in natural monopoly industries. It is for this reason that the selected
monopolist is not only heavily regulated, but that entry is restricted.
161. It should be clear that this analysis does not involve a choice between competition or a lack
of competition. Rather, it is the nature of what is being competed over that varies. See William
McChesney Martin, Jr., A Report, With Recommendations, Sec. Reg. & Leg. Rep. (BNA) No. 114, at EI (August 5, 1971) ("The dispersion of trading from a central auction market is a fragmentation of that
market. This fragmentation has been lauded by some who contend that competition between markets is
desirable. But for competition to be beneficial, it must exist under similar rules and in the same
arena.").
162. According to Lemley and McGowan,
Significantly, private group standard-setting may also be more efficient than de facto
standardization, since having multiple companies participating in a standard means that those
companies can compete to offer products incorporating the standard after it is selected, thus
expanding output and lowering prices. In Katz and Shapiro's model, group standard-setting
trades off first-round competition (to set the de facto standard) to achieve competition within
the standard in later periods.
Lemley & McGowan, supra note 7, at 517 (citation omitted). See also id. at 525-26 (acknowledging
argument that reverse engineering designed to encourage standardization should be permitted, in order
to promote competition within a standard, rather than over it).
163. See Klock, supra note 20, at 771-72 (describing benefits of competition among parallel
markets). Furthermore, as with the very existence of tipping effects, the extent of any potential
inefficiency will vary depending on the proportion of network to inherent value in the relevant good or
service.
164. Such inefficient competition can also be expected, in the ordinary case, between competing
floor-based exchanges and electronic trading systems. In that case, in fact, such competition may be
particularly sharp, and hence costly.
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States.' 65 In essence, the notion was to move the equities markets to
engage in second-order competition among linked trading systems, based
on price and other aspects of individual transactions, rather than first-order
166
competition over which trading system might be the best trading site.
Reducing economic waste by eliminating barriers to competition was hence
67
a central theme of the National Market System project.1
3. First-Mover Advantages, Market Lock-In, and Technological Stagnation
Beyond inefficient standards competition, a final set of potential
network inefficiencies in securities market transition arise from tipping
effects' tendency to produce problematic first-mover advantages.' 68 In
essence, because of the importance of network size to the value of any
given trading network, the most efficient network may not prevail at the
outset, or remain the most efficient, if it does. 169 Instead, an early
entrant-or first-mover-by starting to build its network slightly ahead of
its competitors, may acquire slight size advantages that tipping effects will
quickly translate into predominant market share.' 70 The winner may
165. See Joel Seligman, The Future of the National Market System, 10 J. CORP. L. 79, 81 (1984).
See also Policy Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission on the Structure of a Central
Market System, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 196, at D-5 (April 4, 1973) [hereinafter Structure of a
Central Market System]; Statement on the Future Structure of the Securities Market, Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) No. 137 at 3 (Feb. 2, 1972) [hereinafter Structure of the Securities Market] (suggesting
SEC's shift to preference for central market system, over competing but separate markets, "resulted
from technological developments which made it possible to tie markets together so that one could foster
competition within a central market rather than among separate competing markets").
166. See Donald L. Calvin, The National Market System: A Successful Adventure in Industry Self
Improvement, 70 VA. L. REV. 785, 810 (1984) ("National market system initiatives during the past nine
years have generated more intense competition for public orders, greater cost-effectiveness in the
markets, and specific benefits to investors."); Joel Seligman, Rethinking Securities Markets: The SEC
Advisory Committee On Market Information and the Future of the National Market System, 57 Bus.
LAW. 637, 662 (2002). See also Structure of the Securities Market, supra note 165, at 4.
167. See U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, Transmittal Letter-Institutional Investor
Study Report, H.R. DOC. NO. 92-64, PT. 8, at 22 (1971) [hereinafter Institutional Investor Study Report]
("The evolution of the securities markets has been, and [may] continue to be, affected and distorted by
barriers to competition. Among the most significant of these are minimum commission rates and rules
that insulate markets, market makers and broker-dealers from each other."); Structure of a Central
Market System, supra note 165, at D-2 ("Perhaps the most important objective of the system is to foster
the development of strong competition among its participants.").
168. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 7, at 495 (noting "possibility of material first-mover
advantages"); Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 7, at 8-9 (describing consequences of early lead for longterm structure of network markets).
169. See Katz & Shapiro, supra note 81, at 94 (noting first-mover advantages arising from sunk
costs of particular computer systems). As noted above, this outcome assumes exclusivity (that is, an
inability to join multiple networks). See supra note 152.
170. Cf Economides, supra note 35, at 694; Katz & Shapiro, supra note 85, at 107. See also
Brodley & Ma, supra note 155, at 1163-64 (noting that new entrants into market often find themselves
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achieve market dominance, then, not through the quality or efficiency of its
7
product, but on account of its slight time advantage.' 1
In securities markets, such patterns have long been recognized. Early
emerging exchanges in various financial products are likely to secure a
dominant market position, notwithstanding any number of structural, and
potentially persistent, inefficiencies. 172 The initial dominance of exchangebased auction trading in Russia, which built on established commodities
exchange mechanisms, is illustrative. Notwithstanding various seeming
inefficiencies, exchanges remained in the forefront until the government
intervened in the formation of the RTS, an unsurprising result, given the
173
first-mover advantages of their early entrance.
This might be of little concern, if such an initial advantage could be
easily broken. But tipping effects in network industries produce relatively
strong lock-in effects as well. 17 ' Thus, once a network has secured a
dominant or even exclusive position, it may be difficult to break its hold,
no matter how inefficient it is. 175 This arises from the unwillingness of
handicapped by their late arrival). By way of example, on might note the decision of Island ECNmotivated by its appreciation of such first-mover advantages-to open its limit order book to the public,
in order to increase successively its liquidity and market share, and thereby achieve market dominance.
See Economides, Impact of the Internet, supra note 33, at 10.
171.

See Karl Warneryd, Network Externality and Convention, in 2 DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS

AND THE LAW, supra note 52, at 676 (noting decisive character of initial player's strategy in sequential
coordination game). Conversely, however, potential first-mover advantages and tipping-related
monopoly rents may also spur competition and industry growth, as some believe has occurred in Silicon
Valley. Rather than excess competition, tipping effects may produce heightened (but still efficient)
competition. Rather than technological stagnation, as discussed below, first-mover advantages may
produce dramatic technological advancement.
172. See supra note 110; infra note 192. Cf Paul G. Mahoney, The Allocation of Government
Authority: The Exchange As Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453, 1488 (1997) (noting first-mover
advantages in securities market trading).
173. On this general pattern in the choice of a floor-based versus electronic trading model,
Domowitz has reasoned:
[S]uppose that an electronic exchange is superior to the floor in the long run, once the
network gets large. It may, however, take a long time for the network of traders to get
established on the new type of exchange.
Early electronic traders would pay a
disproportionate share of the temporary, but real, costs associated with trading on a system
that is not compatible with the floor. If such early adopters are unwilling to do so, floor
trading will remiin the standard, despite any long-run benefits to be gained from the
alternative. This is a likely outcome, given that the floor, where it exists, is often truly
predominant, and electronic trading is very unattractive when there are very few traders on
the system.
Domowitz, supra note 33, at 167.
174. See Di Noia, supra note 3 1, at 43 ("The model shows that network externalities may lock-in
exchanges into inefficient outcomes, due to a lack of coordination, even in perfect competition."); Sean
P. Gates, Standards, Innovation, and Antitrust: Integrating Innovation Concerns into the Analysis of
Collaborative Standard Setting, 47 EMORY L.J. 583, 609-10 (1998); Klausner, supra note 38, at 791.
175. See Economides, supra note 30, at 93.
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market participants to move to a smaller-sized network, even given
potential improvements in product quality. 176 Network industries may thus
exhibit "excess inertia."' 177 "The network effect makes it possible that,
even in case of higher prices in both services, the exchange with the higher
price can be chosen."' 78 One consequently observes the path dependent
result 179 that early movers may determine the shape of the market long after
they have grown inefficient.
For this reason, spontaneous evolution will not necessarily produce
efficient markets. With network effects, it is no longer clear that an

Lock-in is particularly important in the presence of market power in sponsored networks. In
general, firms may be very reluctant to change their way of operation, especially if they have
to pay the costs of transition. The self-reinforcing nature of networks creates switching costs
for the existing customers. The existence of positive critical mass often means that in the
presence of one network, a differently organized one may not even exist. These facts give
market power to firms that sponsor networks, and may impede technological innovation.
Id.
176. See Catherine Fazio & Scott Stem, Innovation Incentives, Compatibility, and Expropriation
as an Antitrust Remedy: The Legacy of the Borland/Ashton-Tate Consent Decree, 68 ANTITRUST L.J.
45, 52 (2000) (discussing lock-in effects resulting "[w]hen marginal consumers weigh the network
externality more heavily than the intrinsic value of each technology").
[Clonsumers might have difficulty moving to a new standard-even if they all agreed that the
adopted standard was suboptimal-because of collective action problems. The value of any
alternative system would depend on the number of users adopting it; the rational consumer
might well choose to wait until an alternative had been adopted by others who incurred the
costs of shifting to the new standard but reaped fewer benefits relative to later adopters.
Lemley & McGowan, supra note 7, at 497 (citation omitted). See also Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 7,
at 5 ("As the benefits offered by one network grow, so too do the costs to consumers of choosing, or
switching to, a rival offering."). See also Lewis M. Branscomb & Brian Kahin, Standards Processes
and Objectives for the National Information Infrastructure,in STANDARDS POLICY FOR INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE 5-6 (Brian Kahin & Janet Abbate eds., 1995). Pirrong argues that:
Successful entry requires the new [network] to attract a sufficient number of traders from the
incumbent simultaneously. If this does not occur, the new [network] is very costly to
loperate] because it is illiquid .... Given the difficulty of coordinating the simultaneous
defection of large numbers of traders, it is quite costly for an entrant [network] to survive,
even if its terms and ... policies [are preferablel.
Pirrong, supra note 34, at 155 (emphasis in original).
177. See James B. Speta, Handicappingthe Race for the Last Mile?: A Critique of Open Access
Rules for Broadband Platforms, 17 YALE. J. ON REG. 39, 80 (2000) (describing potential "excess
See also Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization,
inertia" in network industries).
Compatibility, and Innovation, 16 RAND J. ECON. 70, 71 (1985) (indicating that "it is plausible that the
industry, once firmly bound together by the benefits of compatibility or standardization, will be inclined
to move extremely reluctantly to a new and better standard because of the coordination problems
involved"). But see Katz & Shapiro, supra note 147, at 73 (suggesting potential for "insufficient
friction" in some network markets and resulting stranding of earlier purchasers).
178. Di Noia, supra note 31, at 61. See Gillette, supra note 134, at 818-19 (explaining that
transfer to new network would only occur if benefits exceed substantial costs of leaving established
network).
179. Note that this is a different type of lock-in than path dependence, as formally defined.
Whereas path dependence is grounded in historical patterns, network lock-in is tied to the present state
of the market. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 7, at 495.
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inefficient exchange will, in fact, lose out. 180 Rather, tipping effects may
allow it to gain and maintain a dominant position.' 8 In network industries,
including securities markets, "[i]nefficient institutions that are not
conducive to economic growth and development can emerge and
survive." 182 In Russia, thus, commodities exchange-based equities trading
persisted past its point of inefficiency on account of strong lock-in effects
183
in the networked securities markets.
Of course, this does not mean that a new network can never displace
an established first-mover.
If the new technology is sufficiently
advantageous, its inherent value can overcome the network effect. 8 4 In
1 85
such circumstances, the new technology "leapfrogs" the established one.
In the presence of network effects, however, this cannot be assumed, and
requires not merely somewhat more advanced or cheaper technology, but a
186
significant technological improvement or cost-savings.
If one reasonably expects the inherent characteristics of the network
187
system to weigh more heavily in consumer calculus early on, however,
the circumstance in which the prevailing network is inefficient from the
180. See Fischel & Grossman, supra note 16, at 292.
181. In corporate law, this pattern has led some to conclude that network lock-in may stymie state
charter competition. See Kamar, supra note 48, at 1923-24. To similar effect, Michael Klausner, alone
and together with Marcel Kahan, has challenged the contractarian paradigm of corporate law, arguing
that the selection of corporate contract terms may be substantially influenced by network effects. See
Klausner, supra note 38, at 759, 761; Kahan & Klausner, supra note 52, at 726.
The pattern of first-mover advantage and subsequent lock-in would also appear to
characterize the intemet auction market, in which network effects are likewise present. Early player
eBay has thus emerged with an overwhelming and seemingly quite secure share of its market.
182. Voigt & Engerer, supra note 77, at 139. See Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 7, at 9 ("The
market leaders will set the technological standard.., even if other technological standards are superior
in some economic or engineering sense.").
183. Arguably, this pattern of lock-in may again be occurring in Russia, as the still imperfect
NASDAQ-style RTS faces little competitive pressure on its position of market dominance.
184. See Dwight R. Lee & Richard B. McKenzie, A Casefor Letting a Firm Take Advantage of
"Locked-In" Customers, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 795, 796-98 (2001) (noting that "if the gains from
switching are greater than the costs of doing so, incentives exist for entrepreneurs-so-called 'network
sponsors'-to overcome the built-in resistance to change").
185. See Michael H. Knight & Nicholas A. Widnell, Dark Clouds in the Distance? Network
Effects and the Approaching B2B Storm, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 599, 619 (2001) (describing how Sega
gained substantial share from Nintendo through "leapfrog technology"); Lemley & McGowan, supra
note 7, at 517; Melonie L. McKenzie, How Should Competing Software Programs Marry? The
Antitrust Ramifications of Private Standard-Setting Consortia in the Software Industry, 52 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 139, 155 (2002).
186. See McKenzie, supra note 185, at 155. The actual extent of network lock-in has been
contested. See Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 51, at 37; S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis,
Should Technology Choice Be a Concern for Antitrust Policy?, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 283, 310-12
(1996). In any given instance, of course, this is necessarily a question for empirical study.
187. Given smaller network size at the outset, this would appear to be a reasonable assumption.
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outset may not be the greatest concern. Rather, one would expect the most
efficient network to prevail at the outset. There is nothing in the theory of
network effects, thus, that suggests that efficient network sponsors cannot
win standards competitions.
The greater difficulty, in this view, may be that initially efficient
sponsors will grow inefficient through the evolution of technology and
other natural patterns. In network industries, ordinary competition cannot
be relied upon to ensure efficient levels of innovation, given the size effects
described above and the fact that network lock-in will necessarily
undermine the network sponsor's incentive to modernize' 88-by
undercutting competitors' ability to enter. 189 Technological and other
either by the dominant
improvements will therefore not be produced
1 90
network or by its potential competitors.
This pattern is readily envisioned in the securities markets, given rapid
changes in the forms of securities, the volume and speed of trading,
available technology, and the like. Even if potential sponsors of new
market institutions overcome entry barriers and survive the process of
inefficient first-order competition, therefore, we may not end up with the
most efficient market. Rather, inefficient market structures may continue
to prevail on account of strong first-mover advantages. Thus, the first
trading system or independent provider to seek to construct a new trading
network or other market system may emerge as the dominant provider,
even if alternative institutional arrangements prove more efficient.
Moreover, because of lock-in effects, this inefficient network may persist

188. See Katz & Shapiro, supra note 81, at 108 (discussing reduced innovation incentives in
presence of network externalities). Cf Economides, supra note 35, at 695 (arguing that when "new
technology" and "old technology" are alternative equilibria, either "excess momentum" or "excess
inertia" will occur).
189. See Leonard W. Weiss, The Structure-Conduct-PerformanceParadigm and Antitrust, 127 U.
PA. L. REV. 1104, 1132-33 (1979) (discussing lock-in effect barriers to entry in software market). A
reduced incentive to innovate may also arise from free-rider problems in farreaching technological
networks. See Frischmann, supra note 39, at 34.
190. See Economides, supra note 30, at 93; Leeds, supra note 140, at 648 ("If the network
externalities are strong, the consumer may choose to forego adopting the new standard despite the new
innovation. Recognizing this, firms would be less likely to invest in innovation."). Inversely, there is
the possibility that a dominant network competitor, especially in a high fixed cost industry, might utilize
recurring technological innovation to further deter entry, a strategy Microsoft might be argued to be
pursuing, with its recurring upgrades of its Windows operating system. At least in the case of the New
York Stock Exchange, see infra note 192, and the state of Delaware, in corporate law, see Klausner,
• upra note 38, at 850 n.283, this has not been the pattern. There is nothing in the network model of
securities markets, however, to preclude it from being so.
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in its market dominance, notwithstanding substantial failures to maintain
19 1
and update its technological standards.
This has long been the circumstance in U.S. securities markets, which
have lagged in their technological development. Most significantly, the
New York Stock Exchange has long been criticized for its lack of
technological innovation, or even sophistication.' 92 Thus, technology was
another central element in the push toward a National Market System in the
United States.' 93 Notwithstanding the explosion in trading volume through
the 1950s and 1960s, U.S. securities markets continued to rely on a paper
system to clear and settle trades. 194 This resistance ultimately brought on
the "paperwork crisis" of the late 1960s, and the ensuing effort to create the
National Market System. 195 In the U.S. securities markets, thus, the
challenge of effective market linkage was not addressed until regulatory
196
intervention was considered in the 1970s.

191. See Economides, supra note 30, at 92-93 ("A third consequence of the self-reinforcing
nature of networks is that history matters. There is a possibility of lock-in at a Pareto inferior
equilibrium.") (citation omitted).
192. See Dale Arthur Oesterle, Donald A. Winslow & Seth C. Anderson, The New York Stock
Exchange and Its Outmoded Specialist System: Can the Exchange Innovate To Survive?, 17 J. CORP. L.
223, 226 (1992) ("In this changing environment, the NYSE generated very few significant innovations
in trading procedures, membership policies, or product listing."). See also Thomas H. Mclnish &
Robert A. Wood, Competition, Fragmentation, and Market Quality, in THE INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION AND REGULATION OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY 63, 84-85 (Andrew W. Lo ed., 1996).
[A]I1 of the extensive technological innovations in market mechanisms during the past thirty
years have been initiated by the regional exchanges, the third-market dealers, and the
proprietary trading systems (PTS), with the NYSE matching innovations to avoid loss of
market share ... Dominant competitors have little incentive to innovate.
Id. Cf Martin, supra note 161, at E-6. Evidencing the tendency toward lock-in in network markets,
however, the NYSE continues to occupy a dominant position in the global securities markets, even
notwithstanding some recent loss of market share to electronic trading systems.
193. See Calvin, supra note 166, at 790; Macey & Haddock, supra note 14, at 332. See also
Institutional Investor Study Report, supra note 167, at 23 ("We believe that because of modem
communication and data processing facilities it is possible to preserve geographically separated trading
markets while at the same time tying them together on a national basis.").
194. See Walter Werner, The SEC as a Market Regulator, 70 Va. L. Rev. 755, 770-78 (1984). To
similar effect is the continued reliance of even the largest U.S. securities markets on artificial
mechanisms of liquidity. See Lawrence R. Glosten & Paul R. Milgrom, Bid, Ask, and Transaction
Prices in a Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 71, 71 (1985)
("IT]rading on exchanges takes place over time, and some institutional arrangements are necessary to
help match buyers and sellers whose orders arrive at different times."). See also Sanford J. Grossman,
Merton H. Miller, Kenneth R. Cone, Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, Clustering and Competition in
Asset Markets, 40 J.L. & ECON. 23, 57-58 (1997); Madhavan, supra note 24, at 607-08.
195.
See Weiner, supra note 194, at 770-78.
196. Once again, it is apparent that network effects, far from impacting only emerging markets,
have important implications for the restructuring of established markets as well.
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III. HOW LAW MATTERS: COORDINATED EXPECTATIONS AND
THE ROLE OF LAW IN SECURITIES MARKET TRANSITION
97

But creating strong securities markets is hard.1

If the network analysis of securities markets to this point highlights
why law might matter in the emergence of strong securities markets, the
question of how law matters-of what precise function law might have in
that process-remains an open question. 19 8 Where network effects are
wide in scope and substantial in strength, as suggested above, and size and
tipping effects are therefore consequential, the appropriate role of law, if
any, has yet to be identified.' 99
Law and economics has traditionally addressed this inquiry with an
eye to the insights of Ronald Coase, who is most appropriately-if rarelyrecalled as the original advocate of the notion that "law matters" in
securities markets, contrary to neoclassical economics' basic
assumptions.2"'
In particular, legal scholarship has highlighted two
functions of law in this regard. At the outset, law must provide clear
property entitlements.2"' At the other end of the market process, law must
offer reliable contract enforcement mechanisms. 20 2 With time, these
functions have come to be widely acknowledged.20 3

197. Black, supra note 5, at 782.
198. Cf Coffee, Future as History, supra note 3, at 649-50 ("This debate over what may happen
has not yet shifted to its next predictable stage: a policy-oriented discussion of the tradeoffs and the
most effective policy levers by which the law can influence the course and pace of this transition.").
199. Herein, I primarily aim to define law's particular function in securities market transition, and
to justify that role. I outline some preliminary thoughts on the preferred forms and mechanisms of law
that would appear to follow from this analysis, but largely leave this issue for a forthcoming work that
focuses on regulatoryform in market transition, from a game-theoretic perspective.
200. See R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 9 (1988) (highlighting need for
regulation to facilitate operation of securities markets); R.H. Coase, Law and Economics & A.W. Brian
Simpson, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 104 (1996) (."[Iln a regime of positive transaction costs, the
character of the law becomes one of the main factors determining the performance of the economy."').
Cf Robert C. Ellickson, The Case for Coase and Against "Coaseanism," 99 YALE L.J. 611, 611 (1989)
("The 'Coasean world' is not only not Coase's world but, ironically, is more like the world of the
economic theorists that Coase has attacked.").
201. See COASE, supra note 4, at 5; Cross, supra note 4, at 1741 (2002) (describing role of law in
defining property rights). See also Klock, supra note 20, at 781 ("The nice thing about the propertyrights approach is that the amount of off-board trading for each security is determined by the invisible
hand of the market rather than the visible, and clumsy, hand of the SEC.").
202. See Cross, supra note 20, at 1743-53 (describing need for law in contract enforcement); Van
Zandt, supra note 4, at 991.
203. See Partnoy, supra note 6, at 775. He argues:
Economists generally agree that markets function properly only within a well-defined legal
and institutional framework, although there is debate about whether such institutions must be
created by concerted action (which is really simply helping markets to work, and not

2003]

MAKING MARKETS

Of late, Bernard Black and John Coffee have revived the thesis that
"law matters." Drawing on insights gleaned from the attempt to create
securities markets in Central and Eastern Europe, 20 4 they have argued that
20 5
law may also matter, on account of its protection of minority investors.
Such protections, they propose, permit entrenchment of the separation of
ownership and control, which recent empirical analysis has correlated with
20 6
accelerated economic growth and development.
The present analysis, again looking to the post-communist experience,
seeks to add to this line of work. In particular, it suggests that a more
complete appreciation of how law matters in the creation of strong
securities markets-whether in the definition of property rights, the
enforcement of contracts, the protection of minority investors, or
otherwise-must depend on a better understanding of why law might
matter in that process. It is an answer to this question that the proposed
network model of securities markets provides.
The present evaluation does not dispute that the aforementioned
functions of law are important in building strong securities markets. It
does, however, question whether law's role is limited to the margin, as
these tasks suggest. Instead, it points to network effects in securities
markets to suggest that law may have a direct role to play in the very
creation-the making-of strong markets. 207 In doing so, it also challenges

inappropriate governmental intervention), or whether such institutions will develop
spontaneously when the social costs of building them exceed their transactions cost.
Id. It bears noting, however, that even this limited conception of law's role represented a divergence
from the presumption in neoclassical economics and finance economics that markets can form and
function without legal intervention. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 107
(1976); LEE, supra note 20, at 264-65, 308-09 (arguing for highly constrained securities market
regulation, operating through market mechanisms); Frank H. Easterbrook, International Corporate
Differences: Markets or Law?, 9 J. APP. CORP. FIN. 23, 29 (1997). Cf Partnoy, supra note 6, at 773;
David E. Van Zandt, The Regulatory and Institutional Conditions for an International Securities
Market, 32 VA. J. INT'L L. 47, 70-79 (1991).
204. See Black, supra note 11, at 1734 n.3; John C. Coffee, Jr., Privatization and Corporate
Governance: The Lessons from Securities Market Failure,25 J. CORP. L. 1, 9 (1999).
205. See supra note 5. Coffee has particularly emphasized the role of securities law, as distinct
from substantive corporate law, in the creation of strong markets. Nonetheless, the protection of
minority investors remains his focus. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 204, at 17.
206. See supra note 10.
207. Notably, even the literature of the post-Soviet transition has failed to grapple directly with
the origin and making of markets. Instead, legal and economic scholarship has focused on
privatization, see Black, supra note 11, at 1739, price liberalization, see id., elimination of public
subsidies, see McCoy, supra note 94, at 47-49, and other legislative precursors to markets. By
implication, this focus would suggest, markets are not made-by policy, law, or otherwise-but simply
emerge out of transactions cost minimizing moves by those who have capital, those who seek it, and
those who wish to trade it. See Klock, supra note 20, at 763 (quoting Lawrence Harris, Consolidation,
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certain conclusions reached based on the "law matters" scholarship's
orientation to traditional corporate and securities law. In this vein, John
20 8
Coffee's recent contribution to that discourse warrants some attention.
In The Rise of Dispersed Ownership, Coffee presents a historical
analysis of securities market development in the United States, the United
Kingdom, France, and Germany. 21 9 Most significantly, he highlights the
absence of legal protections of minority investors before the emergence of
strong securities markets in the United States and the United Kingdom.21 °
Given this observation,2 1' Coffee challenges the standing assertion that law
matters in the creation of strong securities markets. Rather than seeking to
overturn the identification of law's protection of minority investors as an
essential precondition to strong securities markets-a conclusion he helped
establish 2 Z-Coffee instead recharacterizes law. 2 13 Specifically, he points
to the role of private bonding mechanisms and self-regulation as sources of
minority investor protections in the United States and the United
Kingdom. 2 4 The importance of such "functional substitutes for formal
2 15
law," Coffee argues, preserves the adage: law still matters.

Fragmentation, Segmentation, and Regulation, in GLOBAL EQUITY MARKETS, supra note 24, at 269,

274).
Definitions of markets as that realm within which homogenous goods are identically priced,
see Carney, supra note 20, at 730, may impliedly suggest a theory of arbitrage as the mechanism of
market creation. See William J. Carney, Two Modes of Discourse in the Stakeholder Debate, 43 U.
TORONTO L.J. 379, 383 (1993) (suggesting dynamic application of law of one price, in which price
moves toward uniformity would "describe the creation of new markets"); Peter H. Huang & Michael S.
Knoll, Corporate Finance, Corporate Law and Finance Theory, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 175, 177 n.10
(2000) (highlighting role of arbitrage in ensuring that financial substitutes sell for same price).
Ultimately, however, this may be largely a matter of semantics. In the latter situation, the still difficult
question of market creation simply becomes how one creates the necessary infrastructure (that is,
market) for arbitrage. The network effects-and resulting coordination difficulties-described herein
remain.
208. See Coffee, Rise of Dispersed Ownership, supra note 3.
209. See id. at 7.
210. Coffee further describes the adverse consequences of public interference in the development
of securities markets in both France and Germany.
211. Some argument can be made to challenge this conclusion. See generally Carney, supra note
88 (noting unanimity requirement for fundamental corporate changes that were the norm in U.S.
securities markets in 19th Century).
212. See Coffee, Future as History, supra note 3, at 644, 647; Coffee, supra note 204, at 38. Cf
Cheffins, supra note 3, at 460 n.3.
213. See Coffee, Rise of Dispersed Ownership, supra note 3, at 60 (emphasizing that "much
depends on what we count as 'law'').
214. See id. at 9.
215. See id. at 10.
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While Coffee's emphasis on the public-private character of law is
affirmed by the present analysis, 2 16 the network understanding of securities
markets outlined herein, together with its implications for market transition,
cannot be reconciled with the ultimate conclusion that he seeks to derive
from his historical data. Coffee thus concludes that the true precondition to
strong markets is a laissez faire approach to economic governance. 2 17 Such
a hands-off approach, he argues, will best encourage the development of
the aforementioned private mechanisms of "law," the primary determinant
of the emergence of strong securities markets. Law matters in securities
market transition, therefore, but not-in Coffee's terms- "formal" law.
It is unclear that Coffee's historical analysis can reach this far. While
that history effectively challenges the need for law (that is, public law) to
protect minority investors, and highlights the dangers of excessive public
intervention in securities markets (as in France and Germany), it cannot
support this broader thesis. That public law did not matter in the protection
of minority investors says nothing about whether it might matter in distinct
other respects--ones that Coffee's analysis, and the corporate and
securities law-oriented "law matters" literature generally, may simply have
overlooked. Likewise, that the gross interference in securities markets in
France and Germany might be harmful to securities market development
says nothing about whether other, milder forms of intervention might be
both necessary and efficient.
The network inefficiencies outlined above thus raise questions of
whether law might not have some affirmative role in the creation of strong
securities markets, even if not in the creation of strong minority investor
securities law as
protections. By limiting his attention to corporate and 218
possibility.
this
overlooks
traditionally understood, Coffee
To avoid such omissions, I would instead seek the character of any
law that might facilitate securities market transition in the source of any
such need. In regulation theory, Stephen Breyer has termed this the
"matching" of regulation with justification.2" 9 Where does such an analysis
216. See infra notes 295-303 and accompanying text.
217. See Coffee, Rise of Dispersed Ownership, supra note 3, at 9-10, 52, 61, 76. He argues:
Decentralization in turn made possible private lawmaking and the growth of self-regulatory
bodies. Ultimately, this in turn facilitated the development of market-based institutions, such
as stock exchanges .... [History] confirms this emphasis on decentralization and the growth
of a private sector as the initial precondition.
Id. Cf id. at 9 (identifying hospitability of common law world to private regulatory institutions as
central element in emergence of strong markets).
218. See id. at 81 (highlighting that "private institutional structures played the pivotal role in the
rise of dispersed ownership in the United States and the United Kingdom").
219. See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 191 (1982).
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lead us here? Most significantly, it points to the importance of expectations
in network industries. Thus, highlighting the failure to align market
expectations as the most significant potential inefficiency in network
markets-producing tipping effect barriers to entry, first-mover
advantages, and excess inertia-I will conclude that it is law's coordination
of expectations that is its essential function in securities market
transition.

220

A. EXPECTATION AND TRANSITION IN SECURITIES MARKETS
As described above, a central theme in the study of network effects
has been the importance of adoption expectations. 221 Expectations are also
central features of securities markets, on account of the presence of
network effects and more generally. The formation of expectations
regarding future growth and earnings, future interest in any given stock,
and future liquidity enhancements are thus prominent aspects of the
operation of securities markets.
Expectations are relevant to every economic exchange, of course, but
raise particularly difficult issues in network economies, where value relies
so heavily on the future behavior of other consumers and/or producers of
the same or compatible goods. Such behavior has the potential to
dramatically devalue securities market goods, whether it be exchange
membership, equity listing, or market servicing. 222 Expectations are
especially important in network transition, meanwhile, given the broader
223
range of potential variance from any given equilibrium.
Much of the potential inefficiency of market transition thus turns on
market participants' inability to communicate, match, or otherwise form
reliable expectations regarding the adoption behavior of other market
participants. 224 In securities market transition, the inability to develop firm
expectations regarding what particular market forms will predominate, and
which among a variety of competing market mechanisms will prevail, has
220. Cf. Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1762-64 (2001) (describing role of
private legal system in facilitating cooperation).
221. See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
222. See supra Part 11.
223. Cf. Coffee, supra note 204, at 4 (highlighting importance of regulation in transition context,
where nexus of contracts underpinning corporation is difficult to construct).
224. To be clear, not all network inefficiencies are grounded in expectations failures. While size
effects can be constructed as expectations problems, they can also be understood as arising from the
limites of network ownership structures. The more significant tipping effects in network industries, on
the other hand, are primarily expectations-based phenomena.
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the potential to delay or even prevent the emergence of new markets
225
institutions.
In concrete terms, the importance of expectations can be observed in
the selection of an order- or quote-driven trading system and in the
effective linkage of trading systems in a given emerging market. From the
outset, potential sponsors of new markets (e.g., electronic communications
networks), as well as new or improved market structures (e.g., the
Consolidated Quotation System), may decline to pursue efficiently their
market innovations, based on an inability to determine whether the market
will tip in their favor or to some other network trading system or
technology. 226 For example, such sponsors might rationally hesitate to
develop a quote-driven electronic trading site, or create a linkage system
operating within particular technological and financial parameters (e.g.,
demand-based versus ticker; fractional versus decimal quantification), if
they cannot develop somewhat firm expectations as to whether competing
or constituent trading sites will adopt compatible standards; whether
corporate issuers will favor (and therefore elect to trade on) electronic
versus physical exchanges; and whether traders and investors are prepared
to invest the resources needed for the acquisition of new technologies.
Meanwhile, traders, issuers, and secondary service providers may also
inefficiently hold back from market entry, given their analogous need to
develop expectations regarding future adoption decisions by similarly
situated market participants, and the difficulty of developing such
expectations. Again, each issuer must know whether other issuers will turn
to an order- or quote-driven system, 227 each trader must know where other
traders are likely to direct their transactions, and so on.
Beyond such barriers to entry, expectations are also central to the
existence of potentially inefficient first-mover advantages in securities
market transition, to the tendency of securities markets to exhibit excess
inertia, or lock-in, and to resulting technological stagnation in those
markets. 228 Thus, where floor-based auction trading has secured a
preliminary advantage, as it did in Russia, newly arriving issuers and
that
traders will likely turn to such systems, absent some expectation
229
system.
trading
alternative
some
to
turn
will
issuers and traders
225. Other sources of delay might also be cited, however, including conditions of uncertainty. See
Armen A. Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, 58 J. POL. ECON. 211,212 (1950).
226. See supra Part I.B. I.
227. See Karmel, supra note 96, at 371.
228. See supra Part II.B.3.
229. Much of the complexity of securities market transition, this suggests, lies in the multiplicity
of participants whose expectations intertwine. Thus, while potential market sponsors must develop
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In economic terms, the creation and restructuring of networked
securities markets produces multiple fulfilled expectations equilibria.23 °
Efficient entry by market sponsors, traders, and issuers, among others, is
one potential expectations equilibrium. But the inefficient prospect of no
entry is also possible, given strong network effects.
Consider the following problem. A firm is considering whether
to adopt a new, superior product standard. The good marketed
by the firm is such that a consumer's utility is increasing in the
number of other users of a good adhering to the same standard.
Then there may be multiple equilibria .... If each consumer
expects all other consumers to switch, it is rational for the
individual to switch, and those expectations are indeed fulfilled.
Conversely, if each consumer expects all other consumers to
stay with the status quo, it is rational not to switch, so this is
31
another fulfilled expectations equilibrium.2
B. COORDINATED EXPECTATIONS
The remedy to expectations obstacles in securities market transition
lies in mechanisms of coordination. 232
The potential expectation
inefficiencies of network transition can thus be analogized to "classical
coordination failure," in which pairs of symbiotic markets fail to open, each
on account of the closure of the other. 233 In such circumstances,

expectations regarding the behavior of other potential sponsors, and issuers must develop expectations
regarding other issuers, each must also develop, at greater cost and difficulty, expectations regarding
one another's behavior, as well as the behavior of securities market regulators, professional traders,
investors, bankers, and others. Hence the complexity of coordination, as discussed below. See infra
Part III.B.
230. See supra note 141.
231. Warneryd, supra note 171, at 676.
232. See Dennis W. Carlton & J. Mark Klamer, The Need for Coordination Among Firms, With
Special Reference to Network Industries, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 446, 465 (1983); Philip B. Heymann, The
Problem of Coordination: Bargaining and Rules, 86 HARV. L. REV. 797, 800-01 (1973) (describing
law's interest in coordination problems); Van Zandt, supra note 203, at 69 (describing coordination as
difficulty in securities market creation). See also Coffee, Rise of Dispersed Ownership, supra note 3, at
11-12 (describing role of law in overcoming obstacles inherent in transitional markets); Klausner,
supra note 38, at 764-65 (reasoning that "corporate law may perform a coordinating function similar to
that of technical standards"); Judith B. Sedaitis, Network Dynamics of New Firm Formation:
Developing Russian Commodity Markets, in RESTRUCTURING NETWORKS IN POST-SOCIALISM:
LEGACIES, LINKAGES, AND LOCALITIES 153 (Gernot Grabher & David Stark eds., 1997) [hereinafter
RESTRUCTURING NETWORKS] (highlighting mechanisms by which entrepreneurs come together as key
determinant to success of emerging markets).
233. See Heller, supra note 1, at 236.
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notwithstanding the enhanced efficiency of open markets, each will remain
closed, given an expectation of the continued closure of the paired market.
In the latter circumstance, as "in a network setting, coordination to a
particular 'good' equilibrium is important. 234 In each case, coordination
allows expectations to be aligned, and markets opened. Coordination may
therefore play a central role in securities market transition, by helping
market participants match expectations and thereby move toward the
efficient equilibrium of market participation.
This coordinative role for law in securities market transition goes
beyond "the dominant view of the problem that the law solves-that of
cooperation." 235 In the latter case-exhibited by the standard Prisoner's
Dilemma game-players' interests diverge. 236 In coordination games, on
the other hand, players' interests are substantially aligned.2 37 In the
such common interests may not be
absence of coordination, however, 238
outcomes.
efficient
enough to ensure
In coordination problems, moreover, the precise character of the
equilibrium solution is often not essential. 239 Thus, in the choice of
whether to drive on the left or right side of the road-a classic example in
the literature of both coordination games and network effects-the
particular outcome is less crucial than the identification of some
standard.2 4 °
234. Economides, supra note 30, at 93. See also Economides, supra note 24, at 92 ("Given the
wide multiplicity of expectations equilibria, it is clear that there is a need to create a specific
mechanism that can support a single equilibrium of large participation.")(emphasis in original).
235.
McAdams, supra note 9, at 1651. See also Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social
Norms in Politicsand the Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 765, 778-89 (1998) (describing the role of law in
cooperation games).
236. See McAdams, supra note 9, at 1654-55.
237. See Van Zandt, supra note 203, at 69 n.84.
238. See McAdams, supra note 9, at 1654-55.
239. See Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary InternationalLaw, 66 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1128 (1999) (noting example of coordination game in which selection of standard
takes priority over identity of standard); Richard Warner, Coordinationby Default: Comment on Steven
Burton, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 209, 209-10 (1993) (describing irrelevance of which outcome is
selected in coordination games, so long as all players select same outcome).
240. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 7, at 544 (describing network effects character of
choice of which side of road to drive on); McAdams, supra note 9, at 1652 (describing government
announcement regarding left or right-hand driving that is not oriented to outcome, but to need for
common standard). Voigt and Engerer describe the coordination paradigm:
In this paradigm, coordination is not brought about by some allocation deemed to be desirable
on the outcome level, but by asking what set of institutions will be able to produce
expectations that will make it possible for individuals who do not follow a central plan and
who have largely differing goals to coordinate their plans successfully. This could therefore
be called the coordination paradigm.
Voigt & Engerer, supra note 77, at 134.
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Securities market transition, given the network effect implications
outlined above, is appropriately evaluated within a coordination game
paradigm. In the process of market transition, as in such games, a Nash
equilibrium is sought.2 4' With this outcome, neither player would seek to
alter their choice, given an expectation that the other player will not do so.
Hence, the "equilibrium is ...[the] pair of strategies such that when both
players' expectations are coordinated on it, neither one has an incentive to
242
deviate."
An efficient equilibrium of securities market transition therefore
necessitates some coordination of expectations. 243 In the absence of such
coordination, strong securities markets may not emerge, at least not in a
timely and efficient fashion. Focusing on the preliminary question of
whether public securities markets, as distinct from commercial banks, will
be looked to for corporate financing, 244 this potential outcome is readily
observed. If expectations are not reasonably coordinated around the
construction of public securities markets, potential market sponsors,
issuers, and secondary service providers may prove unwilling to make the
necessary investments to build such markets. More narrowly, even a
failure to coordinate expectations regarding a preferred trading model (e.g.,
order- or quote-driven) 245 may delay or stymie efficient investment in
market transition.
As emphasized by the New Institutional Economics, coordination may
be the central prerequisite to effective institution-building.2 46 If so, a
coordination of expectations may be especially critical in emerging
241. See Wameryd, supra note 171, at 676. See also McAdams, supra note 9, at 1656-57.
242. Warneryd, supra note 17 1,at 676. See Van Zandt, supra note 203, at 69.
243. It is important to note that coordination of network expectations becomes less essential as the
relevant adoptions/choices become increasingly sequential, rather than simultaneous. See Warneryd,
supra note 171, at 676. Where the former is the case, each adoption decision can incorporate existing
information regarding prior adoptions, and a form of de facto coordination can be expected to result.
244. See Black, supra note 5, at 831.
245. See Aggarwal & Angel, supra note 96, at 271-72; Borrelli, supra note 10, at 895-98;
Karmel, supra note 96, at 371; Pirrong, supra note 106, at 519-20.
246. See Voigt & Engerer, supra note 77, at 134. Notably, the present emphasis on coordination
in the creation of securities market institutions echoes the analysis of the New Institutional Economics.
"Transaction cost economics has begun to focus upon norm formation within institutions and the way in
which an ethos of cooperation, public orientation, and rational decisionmaking might develop."
Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Disclosure, and the Microanalysis of
Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1427 (1996). As such, an institutional emphasis may also be
useful in evaluating mechanisms of coordination, especially mechanisms of the public/private variety
that, as described below, would appear warranted in securities market transition. See id. at 1415. To
this effect has Douglass North evaluated "the relevance of shared mental models and ideologies for the
development of institutions," Voigt & Engerer, supra note 77, at 129, the very same transition issue
presented by the existence of network effects in securities markets.
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securities markets, given the scope of the institutional transformation
247
underway.
C.

THE POSSIBILITIES OF PRIVATE COORDINATION

Even if coordination is essential in securities market transition, there is
nothing inherently public in its character. Rather, private institutions can
also facilitate coordination. 248 Among the paradigmatic examples of
private coordination is the widespread practice of group standard-setting.
As highlighted in recent scholarship, such formalized private standardsetting, through groups such as the American Society for Testing &
Materials, InterNIC, and the American Society of Mechanical Engineers,
249
has come to serve central regulatory functions in the modem economy.
It will often serve these functions, in fact, more effectively than legally
defined standards.

250

Private coordination of securities market transition will not necessarily
be effective, however. 251 The obstacles are several, and rooted in a mix of
traditional coordination difficulties and obstacles specific to the presence of
network effects.
Private attempts to coordinate securities market transition are likely to
252
be particularly undermined by the heterogeneity of market participants.
The categories of such participants include traditional exchanges, screen-

based trading (and listing) systems, issuers, institutional investors, brokers,
and dealers, among others. Within each of these categories, meanwhile,

247. Cf Van Zandt, supra note 4, at 989-90 (highlighting greater ease of market creation where
some precursor collective institution already exists).
248. See Bernstein, supra note 220, at 1762-82 (describing role of private legal system in creating
and maintaining cooperation in cotton industry); Kahan & Klausner, supra note 52, at 737-39
(describing coordinative function of underwriters and lawyers in corporate law networks). Cf Klock,
supra note 20, at 792 (criticizing active role for government in "free markets").
249. See Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L. REV. 789, 803-09
(2002) (analyzing public versus private standard-setting). See also Coffee, Rise of Dispersed
Ownership, supra note 3, at 81 (describing how private actors help fill legal vacuum in transitional
markets); Jody Freeman, Private Parties, Public Functions, and the New Administrative Law, 52
ADMIN. L. REV. 813, 826-31 (2000) (describing standard-setting roles of private enterprise).
250. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 7, at 516-17 (discussing ways in which "private
standard-setting organizations are more efficient than government organizations"); Van Alstine, supra
note 249, at 803-09.
251. See COASE, supra note 200, at 10 (noting limitations of private law as source of regulation in
markets).
252. See Cheffins, supra note 3, at 475 (suggesting that self-regulation in the securities market is
effective where there exists some level of homogeneity). Cf Branscomb & Kahin, supra note 176, at
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one can find a broad array of players, from the NYSE to the Pacific Stock
253
Exchange, and from Microsoft to FFLC Bancorp.
This heterogeneity distinguishes private coordination of securities
market transition from private standard-setting. Participants in the latter
projects tend to be at least somewhat homogenous. Trade groups catering
to a specific industry often undertake such standard-setting. 254 The relative
heterogeneity of securities market participants might not be an
insurmountable obstacle to private coordination given a stable equilibrium.
In the midst of transition, however, the nexus of informal contracts that
would undergird any private attempt at coordination would likely be
difficult to build.255
A further obstacle to private coordination of securities market
transition is its necessarily gradual nature. Such gradualism is likely to
have substantial ill consequences in the sensitive, and vital, securities
markets. 256 Private coordination will produce at least temporary illiquidity,
with its attendant ill consequences for price discovery and efficient capital
markets. Thus, for even a small subset of the market to coordinate its
not
transition to new market institutions would be incredibly disruptive,
257
whole.
a
as
market
the
to
but
entities,
participating
the
only to
Other obstacles to private coordination of expectations can also be
The limited efficacy of so-called "cheap talk" is one
highlighted.

253. Among such an array of players, appropriately matched market participants are unlikely to
even find each other, let alone achieve meaningful coordination.
If there were a merger of the two marketmakers, the externalities would be internalized and
the market failure would vanish. However, in a complex system of markets without a rich
variety of communication channels, the two marketmakers are unlikely to find each other.
These are precisely the circumstances where incomplete markets are a likely outcome of
private calculation, and some government coordination is desirable.
Heller, supra note 1, at 240.
254. See Freeman, supra note 249, at 826-31. See also Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of
Groups: The hifluence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133,
136 (1996) (suggesting that transferring power to cohesive trade groups can yield greater returns than
traditional regulation).
255.
Cf Coffee, supra note 204, at 4 (describing unstable character of newly-privatized corporate
entities).
256. Coordination is inherently gradual, of course, even if it is publicly administered. Otherwise,
it would not be coordination, but dictation. See Douglass C. North, Towards a Theory of Institutional
Change, 31 Q. REV. ECON. & Bus. 3, 6 (1991). See also Voigt & Engerer, supra note 77, at 161
("Representatives of NIE reject the assumption that institutional change can be carried out overnight.").
Public coordination is, however, likely to be less gradual than market-based coordination.
257. Cf Voigt & Engerer, supra note 77, at 175. ("Institutional experiment by a single firm is
fine, because it does not matter much for the economy as a whole if it does not work. Institutional
experimentation at the level of the whole economy gives one more pause.") (quoting R.C.O. Matthews,
The Economics of Institutions and the Sources of Growth, 96 ECON. J. 903, 917 (1986)).
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limitation, 258 although this should be of somewhat lesser consequence in
the coordination game of securities market transition. 25 9 Even in cases of
coordination, however, cheap talk continues to taint the efficacy of
communication as an efficient source of private coordination, so long as
some level of conflict continues to exist. In that case, parties continue to
have some incentive to distort their incentives and intentions, in hopes of
achieving a coordinated solution that is also in line with their distinct
preferences. 260
Separately, potential free rider problems in private
standard-setting, arising from broad access to any network standard (i.e.,
market or market information),26 1 may also limit the effectiveness of
private coordination.
Ultimately, however, the very same network effects that make
coordination necessary in securities market transition may stand in the way
of any attempt at private coordination. Tipping effects can be expected to
dissuade market participants from coordinating market entry/transition with
anything less than a dominant collection of other participants, for fear that
the coordinated outcome achieved thereby may lose any subsequent
network competition. 262 As such, many will sit out any attempt at
coordination, just as they would any direct pass at market transition.
Ordinary obstacles to coordination may therefore be aggravated in the
263
presence of network effects.
Related to the possibility of private coordination, the mechanism of
clearly defined property entitlements-and ownership generally-have
been posited as a means of internalizing negative, 264 as well as network
externalities. 265 It has been suggested that network ownership can,
258. See Wameryd, supra note 171, at 676 (stating "[t]alk is cheap").
259. Here, the matched interests of players reduces the benefits of strategic talk, and hence the
devaluation of communication. See McAdams, supra note 9, at 1658 n.20.
260.
The aforementioned heterogeneity must necessarily aggravate such cheap talk problems,
absent some strong repeat-player tendency.
261. See Branscomb & Kahin, supra note 176, at 21.
262. For this reason, while it is true that not all market participants must join in any attempt at
private coordination, most would have to.
263. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 7, at 517-22 (discussing coordination problems in
network markets generally).
264. See Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The
Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 23, 29 (1996)
(describing government's role in internalizing externalities as enforcement of property rights); Jerry
Ellig, The Economics of Regulatory Takings, 46 S.C. L. REV. 595, 596 (1995) (positing clear property
rights, rather than government regulation, as preferred mechanism for internalizing externalities).
265. See William E. Cohen, Competition and Foreclosure in the Context of Installed Base and
Compatibility Effects, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 535, 544 n.40 (1996) (citing Katz & Shapiro, supra note 81,
at 107, who argue that property rights may help internalize network externalities); Liebowitz &
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literally, compensate for such externalities.2 66 Network owners would
make side payments to new users for their entry, to the full amount of the
marginal network enhancement they bring. 267 In securities markets, for
example, the owners of any given trading system would subsidize the
efficient entry of new traders and issuers.
While ownership may serve a salutary function in facilitating the
internalization of network externalities, it is not a panacea, at least in
networked securities markets. To begin with, ownership shares the
limitations of any attempt at internalization. As described above, the
network owner's efficient distribution of the costs of any entry subsidy
among market participants would at best be difficult. Compounding this
difficulty, ownership in securities markets is ordinarily limited to
components of the entire relevant 'market.' Trading in any given security,
and by any given trader, on the other hand, commonly takes place on an
network owner who can
array of independent trading systems. 268 A distinct 269
efficiently subsidize new entry is therefore lacking.
Ownership may also be of limited efficacy, given that some
substantial part of the social benefits of enhanced securities market
networks goes un-internalized by the given market or its
membership/participants. Rather, price information-if openly availablesubsidize
is itself a positive externality. 270 Given as much, owners may not
2 71
efficient network entry-for which they will go uncompensated.

Margolis, supra note 52, at 671; Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 37, at 141-42 (stating that through
ownership, a network owner could be motivated to make investments or provide incentives to increase
the value of the network, by internalizing any externalities). Thus, the owner of a securities market
communications system (i.e., network sponsor) can subsidize membership/participation in order to
internalize the network benefit created.
266. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 7, at 560 (describing how network ownership would
best internalize externalities).
267. See Kolasky, supra note 39, at 579 (describing how externalities will result if network
owners do not compensate additional users); Lemley & McGowan, supra note 7, at 594.
268. See Seligman, supra note 165, at 85-86 (describing regional exchanges' trade in dually-listed
and unlisted securities). See also Dale A. Oesterle, On the Business of Defending NYSE Specialists, 18
J. CORP. L. 79, 86 (1993) (describing the increase in trading on regional exchanges and electronic
crossing networks).
269. Particularly with certain specialized financial instruments, however, such a single-owner
'market' could at least be imagined.
270. See Stephen J. Choi, Selective Disclosures in the Public Capital Markets, 35 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 533, 534-35 (2002) (describing benefits of access to stock prices). See also Hasbrouck, supra
note 27, at 1185 (noting appropriation of informational value of price by derivative markets, which do
not engage in their own price discovery). This potentially significant positive externality can be
expected to lead to substantial under-production of information, or at least accurate information. See
Economides, supra note 30, at 94. See also Mulherin, supra note 2, at 605-25, for a discussion of the
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Even if network ownership could overcome the foregoing obstacles,
however, it would still address only one part of the potential network
inefficiencies of market transition. Tipping effect inefficiencies are thus
less susceptible than size effects to amelioration through mechanisms of
ownership. Even with clear property interests, some role for law in
272
securities market transition therefore persists.
That role, moreover, goes beyond traditional conceptions of law's
function in the emergence of strong securities markets. While merely
coordinative in nature, it goes to the heart of the market creation process.
Unlike the definition of property rights or the protection of minority
investors, law's coordinative role is structural in nature. Through it, law
makes markets.
As John Coffee has noted, however, we know little about law's role in
facilitating structural change. 273
Neoclassical economics, traditional
finance economics, and, for the most part, law and economics have
questioned any role for law in shaping structure.2 74 Rather, they have
sought to rely on the efficiency of market mechanisms themselves to shape
historical differences arising from this pattern. Its modem application arises, of course, in the trading
activity of the exploding number of alternative trading systems.
271. See Economides & Siow, supra note 32, at 116 ("Thus, even when market markers are aware
of the gains from liquidity, and there is competition in fees between market makers and free entry of
market makers, the externality caused by liquidity is still not completely internalized."). A related issue
is that even a single owner would have difficulty allocating the cost of any subsidy among existing
members/participants in an efficient manner, for the reasons described above.
272. In the context of transition, market participants themselves may not internalize and
efficiently compensate for the network externalities of liquidity and price discovery. Cf Romano,
supra note 85, at 518 n.341 ("Some important exchange services that have a network effect are fully
priced: the provision of liquidity is borne by market participants in the form of the bid-ask
spread .... "). For the most part, this arises from the same factors that lessen the efficacy of network
ownership as a remedy to network externalities in securities market transition. The size of the bid-ask
spread, for example, may not efficiently capture the entire, likely fragmented, market, or be reflected
fully in investor returns. Further, incorporation of any network externality into price will not resolve
the uniquely transitionalinefficiencies of market tipping, described above.
273.

See Coffee, Future as History, supra note 3, at 649-50. Some commentary on anticipatory

versus reactive regulation, including in securities law, however, might resonate with this function of
law. Cf Branscomb & Kahin, supra note 176, at 9 (noting distinction between anticipatory and reactive
standards); Emil Bukman, The Cart Before the Horse: Anticipatory Securities Regulation in
Kazakhstan, 22 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 535, 563-64 (1997) (distinguishing between anticipatory and
responsive securities regulation).
274. See Coffee, supra note 204, at 2 n.6. Again, this can be contrasted with the New Institutional
Economics. See supra note 246. A related point is the relative disregard in the law and economics
literature of positive externalities, and related network effects, as distinct from more familiar negative
externalities. See Peter Bohm, External Economies, in 2 DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, supra note 78, at
262 ("Eventually, diseconomies emerged as the important case and economies as the exceptional case,
whereas earlier hardly any importance was attached to technological diseconomies.") (emphasis in
original) (internal citation omitted).
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market structure. 275 The microeconomics of network effects, however,
may suggest at least some circumstances in which law not only matters in
market structure and transition, but is central to it.
D. THE DESIGN AND OPERATION OF LAW'S COORDINATIVE FUNCTION

[f]n a complex system of markets without a rich variety of
communication channels, the two market makers are unlikely to
find each other. These are precisely the circumstances where
incomplete markets are a likely outcome of private calculation,
276

and some government coordinationis desirable.

Given the foregoing, securities market transition to a new 277
or
restructured network likely requires some form of public coordination.
If the efficacy of private action or ownership in securities market transition
varies from conventional assumptions, however, the form of law in that
process is likewise unique. Just as securities markets may not efficiently
emerge if left to purely private initiative, they are also unlikely to emerge
through a series of linear directives from above. 27 8 If law matters in the
coordination of market expectations needed for securities market transition,
the precise form law might take in the coordination process remains to be
seen.
What, then, are the characteristics of law's coordinative function in
280
securities market transition? 279 Most significant is its limited nature.

275. See LEE, supra note 20, at 264-65, 308-09; Klock, supra note 20, at 797 (arguing that
market would have solved problem of market fragmentation, if SEC had not complicated it).
276. Heller, supra note I, at 240.
277. See Di Noia, supra note 31, at 68 ("In the absence of any coordination or policy guide,
implicit merger will not arise."). An entirely separate network-related role for law in securities markets
arises from the claim that network effects favor harmonization of disclosure, accounting, and other
securities market standards. See supra note 8. See also Uri Geiger, The Casefor the Harmonization of
Securities Disclosure Rules in the Global Market, 1997 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 241, 295-97, 305 (1997)
(arguing that network effects in corporate disclosure standards favor global harmonization). Cf
William J. Carney, Large Bank Shareholders in Germany: Saviors or Substitutes?, 9 J. APPLIED CORP.
FIN. 74, 77 (1997) (noting comparison difficulties arising from varied accounting methods in Germany).
The relative significance of network effects in corporate and securities law standards, however, remains
in dispute. See Romano, supra note 85, at 514-27 (2001) (disputing network effects arguments for
regulatory harmonization of disclosure standards).
278. "The spontaneous nature of the process ... requires an alternative view in which transition
unfolds according to its own logic, produced by a specific system of incentives."
SERGUEY
BRAGUINSKY & GRIGORY YAVLINSKY,
MARKET ECONOMY IN RUSSIA 9 (2000).

INCENTIVES AND INSTITUTIONS: THE TRANSITION TO A

279. This question of regulatory form is preliminarily treated here, but is more fully developed in
a forthcoming work.
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Any public coordination of expectations grounded in the network character
of securities market transition need not be primarily directive in nature, nor
281
directed to any specific regulatory outcome.
This holds true for two interrelated reasons.
First, given a
coordination game, such as securities market transition, the aligned
interests of the private market players can be expected to alleviate at least
part of the need for public direction. Private interests can be expected to
efficiently interact without legal intervention, once an initial, coordinated
equilibrium is established.28 2
Matched private interests, however, are not sufficient. Whenever
market participants engage in collusion, matched interests-however
destructive-exist. The second justification for a limited coordinative role
for law thus arises from the general correlation of social and private utility,
where network effects are at work. With network effects, as distinct from
negative externalities, any market failure that arises involves no conflict of
public and private values. Rather, both social and individual utility are
maximized through coordination, and the network efficiencies that follow
from it.283 In the case of negative externalities, on the other hand, law's

280. "Here government appears to have a critical, if restrained, role." Branscomb & Kahin, supra
note 176, at 25. Branscomb and Kahin further argue:
De facto [National Information Infrastructure] standards will emerge whether or not the
government plays a significant role in organizing and leading standards activity. However,
full realization of Internet-style interoperability requires institutionalized, technically
insightful, industry-spanning capacity to develop anticipatory standards.... It callsfor both
public-private consensus and leadershipto help the consensus come about.
Id. at 25 (emphasis added). Cf Farrell & Saloner, supra note 177, at 79-80 (noting minimal
communication necessary to overcome excess inertia in network industries). Such restraint is especially
advisable, in the absence of empirical evidence suggesting that the presence of network effects in a
particular securities market are actually producing transitional inefficiencies. See Klock, supra note 20,
at 764. Cf COASE, supra note 200, at 13.
281. See McAdams, supra note 9, at 1652 ("[W]hen people are otherwise at a loss for how to
coordinate, it takes surprisingly little to guide expectations and behavior."). See also Branscomb &
Kahin, supra note 176, at 19 ("Visions, rather than plans, should guide public/private... [standardsetting] strategy.").
282. "When individuals have a common interest in coordinating, as frequently occurs, a legal rule
may guide behavior merely by influencing expectations about how others will behave." McAdams,
supra note 9, at 1651.
283. Both private welfare and public welfare were thus served by the coordination to a common
standard in HDTV technology, as described below. Nagel analogizes this to:
the familiar and unproblematic Hobbesian basis for coercion: I may want to be forced to do
something as part of a practice whereby everyone else is forced to do the same, with results
that benefit us all in a way that would not be possible unless we could be assured of
widespread compliance. This is not really forcing people to do what they don't want to do,
but rather enabling them to do what they want to do by forcing them to do it.
Thomas Nagel, Moral Conflict and PoliticalLegitimacy, 16 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 215, 224 (1987).
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intervention is designed to alter privately efficient behavior, in order to
achieve goals of social efficiency.2 84
As a result, law's coordinative function would appear to involve
primarily the provision of the initial impetus necessary to coordinate
expectations and hence achieve network efficiencies. 285 Beyond this initial
step, private action can be expected to approach network efficient
outcomes.286 Rather than the imposition of sanctions, the crucial role of
law in securities market transition is therefore to provide a preliminary
mechanism of coordination, or standardization. It must "[t]ry to identify
the productive potential and hitherto unexploited potential of internal
287
institutions and help private actors to realiz[e] it by acting as a catalyst.This expressive function of law in securities market transition is well
matched to the potential expectations failure arising from the presence of
network effects.28 8 Regulation going beyond a coordinative function, on
the other hand, is likely to mismatch the network need. Such overreaching,
moreover, carries the greater risks of lock-in and technological stagnation
289
that characterize public standard-setting.
One way we might conceptualize such a nontraditional role for law is
as shaping conventions, which more directly govern the conduct of private
market participants. 290 Coordination thus produces informal institutions, in
the form of 'conventions.' These, in turn, are self-enforcing, because no
individual party can improve upon their efficiency unilaterally. 29 1 In
securities markets, to this effect, preferred or even standardized trading
patterns can be characterized as market conventions, which require some
initial public impetus to form.
284. Just as law's goal in network transition-coordination-varies from the standard orientation
of law-cooperation-so does its tool of choice. While sanctions are the ordinary solution law offers,
in securities market transition, law's expressive function may be its most essential contribution. See
McAdams, supra note 9, at 1650-51 (describing expressive function of law).
285.
"In short, standards strategy.., should be enabling, not prescriptive." Branscomb & Kahin,
supra note 176, at 19. See id. at 4 (in standard-setting, government operates "in the role of enabler").
286.
See id. at 13 (noting government's role in "convening diverse interests and facilitating

cooperation across industry and sectoral boundaries"). For similar reasons, the law's coordinative
directions in securities market transition will often be implicit, versus explicit, in nature.
287.
288.

Voigt & Engerer, supra note 77, at 174.
Cf BREYER, supra note 219, at 191 (describing need to match regulatory response to

underlying market failure).
289. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 7, at 544 (discussing problems of government standardsetting).
290. The role of conventions has been particularly emphasized, notably, in the study of network
effects. See Warneryd, supra note 171, at 675 (discussing how conventions are used to solve
coordination problems created by network effects).
291. See McAdams, supra note 9, at 1694; Voigt & Engerer, supra note 77, at 133.
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Such conventions in securities market transition might include, among
others, the initial determination of whether to rely on banks or securities
markets for corporate financing, 292 and the subsequent election of a floor293
based or electronic trading system, and an order- or quote-driven system.
In these cases, law would serve to make one of the possible equilibria focal,
by simultaneously highlighting an efficiency preference for a coordinated
outcome generally and creating a preliminary referent to help facilitate
private bargaining toward one particular coordinated equilibrium. As
suggested in the following Section, 294 securities regulators can thus help
encourage coordination around a network-efficient common standard,
including the development of strong securities markets and the use of an
electronic trading model, for example.
As this perspective suggests, the coordination of expectations in
securities market transition is ultimately as much a private process as a
public one. Rather than directives from public to private, it is characterized
in
by the use of incentives. 295 The relationship of public and private 296
coupling,"
"loose
a
as
of
thought
be
thus
can
securities market transition
in which public and private jointly shape market growth and
development. 297 In this view, securities market transition arises from initial
followed by extended and substantial
and limited legal coordination,
298
action/regulation.
private
A regulatory model grounded in private execution of law's signal is
especially appropriate in securities markets, given the centrality of private
In securities markets,
regulation in strong securities markets. 299
interdependent public and private rules are the norm, creating a balance
292. See Black, supra note 5, at 832-34.
293. See supra note 245.
294. See infra Part I.E. As noted above, the precise mechanisms of law's coordination function
are further analyzed in a forthcoming work.
295. See BRAGUINSKY & YAVLINSKY, supra note 278, at 9 (suggesting limited efficacy of efforts
"to steer... developments" toward a market system, as opposed to using "a specific system of
incentives").
296. Gernot Grabher & David Stark, Organizing Diversity: Evolutionary Theory, Network
Analysis, and Post-Socialism, in RESTRUCTURING NETWORKS, supra note 232, at 1,11.
297. Cf Coffee, supra note 204, at 22.
298. "That is, in place of the dichotomously forced choice of restructuring directed by state
agencies versus restructuring via market processes ...[securities market transition may involve] the
possibilit[y] of alternative co-ordinating mechanisms governed neither by hierarchy nor by markets."
Grabher & Stark, supra note 296, at 3. See also Walter W. Powell, Hybrid Organizational
Arrangements:New Form or TransitionalDevelopment?, 30 CAL. MGMT. REV. 67 (1987).
299. See Partnoy, supra note 6, at 773-75 (discussing ways market reduces agency and
information costs on its own). But see id. at 775 n.159 (noting risk of extensive role for private
regulation).
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that ordinarily ought not be disrupted. 300 By way of example, one might
highlight the complex public-private character of the National Association
of Securities Dealers ("NASD") and the Financial Accounting Standards
Board ("FASB"), central institutions in the regulation of U.S. securities
markets.30 Subject to the oversight and veto of the SEC, these formally
private entities 30 2 nonetheless enjoy substantial regulatory authority over
the securities markets, arguably playing a greater role in their day-to-day
operations than the SEC itself. A public-private model of securities market
transition is also favored, then, by the sensitive regulatory equilibrium that
30 3
has emerged in the securities markets.
Law's coordination of expectations in securities market transition,
along the broad lines described to this point, does not readily fit within
ordinary models of law's domain. On the other hand, neither is it without
precedent. Rather, it has been manifest in technology standard-setting for
some time, including in the development of HDTV technology.
As noted above, the development of HDTV continues to be hampered
30 4
by divergent technology standards among the leading industrial states.
Nonetheless, the important milestone of a unified standard within the
United States was recently achieved through public coordination of a
similar sort to that described herein. At the outset, this involved an
extended dialogue among the public and private parties of interest, initiated
by government regulators. 30 5 As this process dragged on, the threat of FCC
action to mandate its own standard played a decisive role, prompting U.S.
private industry to voluntarily form a "Grand Alliance" around a particular
digital standard.30 6
300. See Craig Pirrong, A Theory of Financial Exchange Organization, 43 J.L. & ECON. 437, 468
(2000) (stating that caution is balanced against regulation).
301. See Shelley A. Finger, Jones v. SEC: Upholding the SEC's Ability to Impose Sanctions in
Addition to Those of the NASD, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 989, 1007 n.99 (1999); Steve Cocheo, Enron
Comes to Main Street, A.B.A. BANK. J., May 2002, at 8 (referring to "quasi-public Financial
Accounting Standards Board"). See also Alan Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities
Offerings, 1999 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1, 24; Comment Letter of Securities Industry Association to
SEC, Regarding Proposed Rule Changes of Self-Regulatory Organizations, Apr. 6, 2001, available at
http://www.sia.com/2001 commentletters.
302. See Jones v. SEC, 115 F.3d 1173, 1183 (4th Cir. 1997) (classifying NASD as private party).
303. As described above, even strong network inefficiencies need not undermine the place of
private regulation, beyond law's initial coordination of market participants, given some proximate
correlation of private and public interests in network transition. See supra notes 283-284 and
accompanying text.
304. See supra note 143.
305. See Branscomb & Kahin, supra note 176, at 14-15.
306. See id. Given the long delay in getting to even a U.S. standard, as well as some continued
criticism of the standard identified, the government's coordinative role in HDTV standardization is
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This pattern can be favorably contrasted with the FCC's unwillingness
to play a coordinative role in the development of AM stereo in the early
1980s. Absent such coordination, private industry proved unwilling to
devote the necessary resources to develop the technology. Needless to say,
it never took hold.
E.

LAW'S COORDINATION OF EXPECTATIONS IN SECURITIES MARKET
TRANSITION

The nature of any public coordination of expectations in securities
market transition is necessarily specific to individual circumstances,
including the existence of sufficient evidence that network inefficiencies
are actually impeding market creation or restructuring. Nevertheless, two
preliminary elements of such a coordinative role-the elimination of
barriers to coordination, and the government's role as a "market
participant"-can be highlighted. In addition, a pair of examples of more
affirmative coordination-one in Russia and one in the United States-can
be evaluated for additional features of this rough portrait of law's
coordinative role.
Among the most basic elements in law's coordination of expectations
is the elimination of barriers to its occurrence, whether public or private in
nature. Potential antitrust restraints on effective coordination, in particular,
must be identified and kept in check if securities market transition is to
efficiently occur.30 7 Rather than barring coordination through antitrust law,
Again
regulation may instead need to facilitate its occurrence.30 8
suggesting the unique role of law in market transition, its primary
regulatory function in this case would seemingly be to minimize, rather
than enhance, restraints on market activity.
The coordination needed to align market expectations across a
multiplicity of participants is a form of horizontal agreement among
competitors, which ordinarily might be circumscribed by Section 1 of the

probably best recalled as an example, rather than a model, of law's coordinative role in market
transition.
307. See Carlton & Klamer, supra note 232, at 465; Van Zandt, supra note 4, at 980 n.54
(describing Supreme Court's antitrust protection of market-making by Chicago Board of Trade).
308. See Di Noia, supra note 31, at 68 (suggesting that "[r]egulation should guide or favour
implicit merger, eliminating all obstacles to listing and delisting in exchanges and to trading,
implementing, in full, remote access"). As this suggests, antitrust restraints not only on coordination
itself, but on the potential increase in market consolidation that can be expected to follow from it, must
be carefully managed.
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Sherman Act.3 °9 Such horizontal agreement is precisely what efficient
transition requires, however, if network effects are to be overcome. 310 It is
therefore essential that antitrust law not ordinarily, let alone invariably,
stand in the way of such outcomes. 3 1' Rather, the economic effects of such
'collusion' (i.e., coordination) must be considered under a rule of reason,
with particular attention given to network effects' implications for
securities markets.l312
Notably, such protection from the strictures of antitrust law has long
been a feature of U.S. securities markets.3 3 The presence of network
effects may thus help explain the securities markets' long-standing, if still
ambiguous, immunity from antitrust scrutiny. 314 While neither the
Supreme Court's decisions in U.S. v. NASD 315 and Gordon v. NYSE,31 6 nor
the SEC's pronouncements on implied antitrust immunity have suggested
as much, nor have they explicitly tied antitrust immunity in securities
markets to the need for effective market coordination, such immunity is

309. See Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet StandardizationProblem, 28 CONN. L. REV.
1041, 1079 (1996). See also Lemley & McGowan, supra note 7, at 518; Manisha M. Sheth,
Formulating Antitrust Policy in Emerging Economies, 86 GEO. L.J. 451, 455 (1997) (describing basis
for antitrust law prohibition of horizontal agreements, especially in developing countries). Such
resistance to standard-setting among competitors is hardly unwarranted, given the risks of price-fixing
and the exclusion of potential competitors that arise from such arrangements. See Lemley, supra, at
1079-80. Analogous self-regulation has thus received mixed judicial reviews. See Silver v. NYSE,
373 U.S. 341 (1963) (questioning permissible scope of self-regulation under antitrust and securities
market legislation); Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 467-68 (1941)
(condemning self-regulatory arrangement among market participants asserted to "protect the
manufacturer, laborer, retailer and consumer") (intemal quotations omitted).
310. "In fact, a cartel of exchanges may be socially desirable." Domowitz, supra note 33, at 16970. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 7, at 518 (suggesting horizontal standard-setting agreements
should be viewed more leniently in network industries).
311. See Di Noia, supra note 31, at 68.
312. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 7, at 509-10 (noting need to deal flexibly with
agreements among competitors in network industries). A fascinating account of the need to temper
antitrust restraints on coordination in industries characterized by network effects can be found in
Carlton & Klamner, supra note 232. Coming before the wave of economic analysis and characterization
of the network effects phenomenon, Carlton and Klamer foreshadow many of its central elements and
implications. Ultimately, however, they fail to characterize, in economic terms or otherwise, the
specific economic condition of network effects.
313. Cf Katz & Shapiro, supra note 38, at 439 (noting importance of antitrust exemptions in
achieving network compatibility).
314. See Dan W. Schneider, Evolving Proof Standards Under Section 7 and Mergers in
Transitional Markets: The Securities Industry Example, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 1, 14 (noting Supreme
Court's holding of antitrust law to be largely inapplicable to securities markets because of SEC's
overarching supervisory role). But see id. at 13 (noting absence of any specific exemption of securities
regulation from antitrust law).
315. 422 U.S. 694 (1975).
316. 422 U.S. 659 (1975). See also Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341 (1963).

2003]

MAKING MARKETS

understood with reference to a network
both consistent with and readily 317
analysis of the securities markets.
Beyond eliminating obstacles to coordination, another feature of the
law's role in coordinating securities market transition comes through the
government's role as "market participant. '3 18 While not without some
controversy, the government does play at least some participatory role in
moreover,
securities markets.3 19 Such indirect 'intervention' in the32market,
0
raises fewer efficiency concerns than other possibilities.
In coordinating securities market transition, this market participant
function may play an important role. Thus, the selection of trading
mechanisms and trading sites by the government and its satellite agents can
help coordinate the process of market creation and restructuring. The
particular investment vehicles selected in such circumstances might play a
similar role. The timing and mechanism of debt issues by the government,
32 1
finally, can also be expected to influence the market transition process.
317. To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that network effects obviate the role of antitrust law in
securities markets and their transition. To the contrary, assurance of access to "essential [network]
facilities" is also crucial to an efficient market. See David McGowan, Regulating Competition in the
Information Age: Computer Software As an Essential Facility Under the Sherman Act, 18 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 771, 782-83 (1996). In essence, transition to an efficient market, with maximum
participation, may necessitate public intervention to prevent the exclusion of participants. Individual
participants' refusal to participate is also problematic. Thus, just as traders and exchanges cannot be
efficiently denied access in the presence of network effects, efficiency may also dictate that they not be
able to operate independent of the dominant network. Recent claims directed against Island ECN,
which has failed to submit its best bid and ask prices to the Intermarket Trading System, highlight this
issue. Given the network efficiency demands, the SEC has appropriately been questioned for its
decision to direct the NASD to drop a suit seeking to force Island ECN to comply. See Gretchen
Morgenson, In a New World, a Puzzling Directivefrom the SEC, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2002, at Cl.
318. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 7, at 541 n.273, 544-45 (describing role of government
as "market participant" in network industries). See also Howard S. Dakoff, The Clipper Chip Proposal:
Deciphering the Unfounded Fears That Are Wrongfully DerailingIts Implementation, 29 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 475, 482-84 (1996) (describing example of government's use of purchasing power to shape
network standard).
319. In the United States, present and potential examples include the federal employee retirement
savings plan, proposals to allow individual investment of Social Security funds, see Roberta S. Karmel,
Regulatory Implications of Individual Management of Pension Funds: The Challenge to Financial
Regulators Posed by Social Security Privatization,64 BROOK. L. REV. 1043 (1998), and the possible
investment of federal surplus funds in equities, see The Rubin-Jackson Raid, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 1999,
at A20, available at 1999 WL-WSJ 5438938. For the moment, however, the government's most
significant "market participant" impact on equities markets comes in its debt functions, which have
substantial implications for the stock market.
320. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 7, at 541 n.273; id. at 545 ("But even when the
government acts deliberately to support (or undermine) a standard, such action does not raise the same
sorts of concerns as mandatory standards, at least when the government lacks monopsony power.").
321. See Jody Freeman, The ContractingState, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 155, 168 & n.57 (2000)
(highlighting government's influence as market participant).
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In Russia, to this effect, the government's early pattern of offering shortterm debt at incredibly high rates of return served to strengthen the banking
industry, which held much of this debt, and weaken the securities markets,
322
which could not offer a similar return.
In addition to eliminating barriers to effective coordination in
securities market transition, and asserting its buying power to assist in the
latter process, the law may also play an affirmative role in coordinating
transition. Some features of the role of law in directly facilitating
coordination can be extracted from two examples of such coordination.
The first is the Russian Federal Commission on Securities Markets'
("FCSM") role in the establishment of NAUFOR, the major self-regulatory
organization of brokers and dealers in Russia, and in the creation of the
Russian Trading System ("RTS"). The second is the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission's ("SEC") pursuit of a National Market System
323
since the early 1970s.
The FCSM's exceptional approach to Russian securities markets
received wide attention among observers of law in Moscow during the
1990s. Dating to its establishment in 1993, the FCSM focused as much of
its regulatory energy on creating the infrastructure of efficient capital
markets in Russia, as on adopting the rules to support that infrastructurethe conventional task of securities regulation. 324 These structural efforts
have included work to facilitate the development of reliable nationwide
share registration and depository services, 325 to encourage the
326
establishment and growth of unit investment funds (i.e., mutual funds),
and to delineate the role of commercial banks in Russia's capital
markets.3 27
Most important, however, has been the FCSM's role in the
establishment of NAUFOR and the RTS. In May 1994, as privatization
progressed and the availability of public subsidies declined, and the
322. See Asya S. Alexandrovich, Bankruptcy Law, an Economic Medicine: How Russia's New
Bankruptcy Legislation Facilitated Recovery From the Nationwide Financial Crisis of August 17, 1998,
34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 95, 105 (2001).

323. As noted above, the present treatment of these examples is not intended to be comprehensive,
but introductory.
324. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 102, at 522-25.
325. See Richard P. Cunningham, Jr., Corporate Governance and Foreign Investment Nightmares
in Russia: A Case Study of Unified Energy Systems, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 889, 898-99 (2002) (describing
depository requirements promulgated under FCSM); Lumelsky, supra note 154, at 139-42 (noting
FCSM's efforts to reform registration process).
326. See Ratinov, supra note 109, at 1795 (describing emerging Russian mutual fund market).
327. See Lumelsky, supra note 154, at 127 (describing commercial banks as main threat to
FCSM's goal of strong securities market).
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demand for private capital consequently began to grow, the FCSM
convened a small group of reputable brokers and dealers to help carry
forward the evolution of Russia's capital markets. 328 From this group,
there emerged the self-regulatory organization NAUFOR. The FCSM
delegated substantial regulatory authority to the organization, including the
authority to develop market rules and impose discipline. 329 Additionally, it
provided technical assistance, through U.S.A.I.D. consultants, to the broker
members of NAUFOR and paid the operating expenses of the organization
330
during its first eighteen months of operation.
NAUFOR, in turn, established RTS as a NASDAQ-style, screen-based
equities trading system for Russia's largest corporate enterprises. This
system-it was expected, and it has proven true-would replace the
thousands of equity trading operations that had formed across Russia. The
FCSM again played a central role, financing purchase of the computers and
modems necessary for NAUFOR members to utilize RTS, once more with
33 1
U.S. assistance.
Since their establishment, NAUFOR and RTS have emerged as the
dominant institutions in Russian equities markets, arguably overshadowing
even the FCSM itself. In 1994, with a market consisting of small groups of
traders, spread over Russia's fifteen time zones and trading paltry share
volumes, the mechanisms of the market's evolution could not have been
discerned. It was entirely unclear whether a strong securities market would
even be pursued, whether a quote-driven electronic system or a floor-based
auction system would be favored, and how Russia's traders would
effectively be linked.
With the government's May 1994 signal, as subsequently reinforced
by its financial assistance to brokers seeking to participate in RTS, these
The FCSM's
expectations barriers were effectively overcome.
coordinative intervention involved minimal public direction, let alone
dictation of outcomes. Rather than insisting upon a quote-based screen
system, for example, the FCSM simply convened the initial founders of

328.
329.
330.
331.

See FRYE, supra note 150, at 127.
See id. at 127-28.
See id. at 127.
See Michael P. Claudon & Andrey F. Yakushin, The Sell-Side of the Russian Securities

Market, in INVESTING IN RUSSIA'S SECURITIES MARKET: AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE STATE

OF PLAY 34 (Geonomics Institute ed., 1996) (noting U.S.A.I.D. sponsorship of development of RTS).
See also FRYE, supra note 150, at 48, 127 (noting FCSM's provision of computers and other technical
and financial assistance in formation and early operation of RTS).
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NAUFOR, and then facilitated their efforts, allowing them to332develop and
evolve the trading system largely without public intervention.
Several elements of law's coordinative role in securities market
transition might be distilled from this first example. Most clear is the
public role in bringing the relevant parties together. In essence, the FCSM
created the necessary interface for coordination to occur. Additional
interrelated elements of law's coordination of market transition suggested
by the Russian case are the government's educational/training function and
its provision of necessary financing. As to the former, the FCSM helped
inexperienced Russian brokers and dealers develop the basic skills
necessary for increased efficiency. It further provided needed financing
both for the coordinative mechanism333of NAUFOR, and for brokers to
actually participate in the RTS system.
The coordination of expectations in the case of the FCSM thus
involved a careful balance. On the one hand, the public intervention did
not dictate outcomes at any level of specificity. Yet it did favor certain
trends, as in the selection of an electronic trading mechanism. Such
coordination, however, unlike direct regulation, did nothing to prevent
market participants from electing to adopt alternative arrangements, if
otherwise more efficient.
One can understand the SEC's contribution to the development of the
National Market System in a similar light. In the wake of U.S. securities
markets' "paperwork crisis" in the late 1960s, the SEC issued a series of
policy statements on the utility and form of a more nationalized market in
equity shares. 334 In this world, as described by the SEC statements,
improved technology and resulting communications linkages among
enhance trading competition,
exchanges and other trading systems would
335
efficiency.
market
increase
and thereby

332. See FRYE, supra note 150, at 128.
333. See id. at 127. Cf Cybo-Ottone et al., supra note 32, at 251-52 (noting potential use of
payments to induce coordination).
334. See J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Shareholder Communication Rules and the Securities and
Exchange Commission: An Exercise in Regulatory Utility or Futility?, 13 J. CORP. L. 683, 720-21
(1988) (describing SEC call for national transactional system in response to "paperwork crisis"). See
also Structure of a Central Market System, supra note 165: Structure of the Securities Market, supra
note 165.

335. See Brown, supra note 334, at 722-24 (describing increased efficiencies from national
market); David A. Lipton, Best Execution: The National Market System's Missing Ingredient, 57
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 449, 508 (1982) ("The national market system is an innovative effort to link our
various securities markets in order to enhance competition, to foster efficient execution, to make
available current quotation and sale information and to assure the practicability of best execution.").

2003]

MAKING MARKETS

The SEC's drive seemingly bore fruit in 1975, with Congress'
adoption of Section 11A of the Securities Acts Amendments, in which it
directed the commission to "facilitate the establishment of a national
market system for securities." 336 Oddly, however, the SEC's legislation of
a national market likewise reached its acme in 1975, with the elimination of
fixed commissions. 337
Thus, both the SEC's five-year drive for
congressional authority to create a National Market System and its
contribution to that process largely ended in 1975.
While much ink has consequently been spilled over the success or
failure of the National Market System, 338 the coordinative role of law in
securities market transition may readily explain this otherwise ambiguous
legislative pattern. This understanding begins with an appreciation that, in
substantial part, a national market in equity securities now exists in the
United States.3 3 9 While its establishment cannot be tied to any particular
date, it is clear that technological developments, and their adaptation and
adoption by private market participants, have moved U.S. securities
markets much of the way to such a system.
The SEC's contribution, in this light, can be seen as providing a
regulatory signal that advances in technology and some form of national
market in equity shares were essential.
This signal, given in the
commission's nonbinding policy pronouncements and confirmed by
Congress' legislative sanction, served a coordinative, or focal function in
the markets. 340 Specifically, it led private entities to take the initiative to
develop a national trading market analogous to, yet distinct from, that
preliminarily defined by the SEC. 34 1 In the case of the National Market
System, then, the seeming threat of directive public intervention may have

336. 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(2) (1982).
337. See Edmund W. Kitch, Hard Thinking about Inevitable Developments?, 2000 COLuM. Bus.
L. REV. 37, 38 (noting elimination of fixed commissions by 1975); A.C. Pritchard, Markets as
Monitors: A Proposalto Replace Class Actions with Exchanges As Securities FraudEnforcers, 85 VA.
L. REV. 925, 1012 (1999) (describing demise of fixed commissions).
338. See, e.g., Calvin, supra note 166, at 810 (suggesting National Market System regulatory
effort succeeded); Macey & Haddock, supra note 14, at 322-25 (challenging SEC's failure to
implement National Market System).
339. See Calvin, supra note 166, at 800-01.
340. See Klausner, supra note 38, at 800-01, 828-30 (discussing function of "focal points" in
corporate law); McAdams, supra note 9, at 1651, 1659.
341. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 7, at 545 ("The market can and will ignore government
efforts at leadership if its interests lie elsewhere."). Such flexibility should not be overstated, however.
Public coordination of expectations does carry some force. See Klausner, supra note 38, at 765 n.20
(noting that "voluntary standards are 'a little stronger than voluntary').
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been an additional element in law's coordinative function. 342 Private
market participants saw fit to develop their own market infrastructure, to
avoid the SEC's imposition of its model.
The SEC's role in the creation of a National Market System also
suggests one further element of law's coordinative role. In the case of the
National Market System, the SEC delineated the broad parameters of a
potential market structure in a series of policy statements. This 'model'
provided a common starting point from which market participants could
move forward. Such government proposals may therefore constitute
another component in law's coordination of securities market transition.
Such a facilitative role for law in securities market transition, it should
be clear, is not uncontroversial. Rather, no less than Adam Smith dissented
from any such public role:
People of the same trade seldom meet together even for
merriment or diversion, but the conversation ends in a
conspiracy against the publick, or in some contrivance to raise
prices. It is impossible indeed to prevent such meetings, by any
law which either could be executed, or would be consistent with
liberty and justice. But though the law cannot hinder people of
the same trade from sometimes assembling together, it ought to
do nothing to facilitate such assemblies; much less to render
343
them necessary.
These fears may not be entirely unwarranted. In the presence of
strong network effects, however, law's facilitation-its coordination-may
nonetheless be essential to an efficient process of securities market
transition.
Ultimately, then, law matters vitally in securities market transition on
account of the presence of network effects that can delay or stymie the
efficient creation and restructuring of securities markets. Given as much, a
central role for law in the very creation and shaping of securities markets is
its coordination of market expectations, by acting as a catalyst in the
market-making process.

342.
Cf Branscomb & Kahin, supra note 176, at 24 ("As in the HDTV proceeding, perhaps the
threat of intervention should be the big stick that is carried but never fully used.").
343.

ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF THE

NATIONS 145 (Mortimer J. Adler ed., 1990) (1776).
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CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have offered the preliminary outlines of an alternative
model of securities markets' basic functions and nature, grounded in the
microeconomics of network effects and finance theory. This proposed
network model of securities markets can serve as a useful tool in seeking
better to understand, assess, and shape securities market transition. Its
benefits are especially apparent in transitional states such as Russia. Yet
the model also suggests useful lessons for market transitions in established
344
economies, including the United States.
Network effects in securities markets may produce a number of
dynamic inefficiencies, including market underutilization, barriers to entry,
and technological lock-in, which may delay or even prevent the efficient
creation and restructuring of securities markets. In the face of these
inefficiencies, the denial of any role for law in strong securities markets is
difficult to sustain. Even the service of law as a source of property rights,
contract enforcement, and minority investor protections, however, may not
capture the full role of law, or even its most significant elements.
Instead, law appears to have a structural role in securities market
transition, helping to coordinate market expectations toward the efficient
equilibrium of compatible entry. This nontraditional role for law, more
directed to process than to outcome, might actually be the central way in
which law matters in securities market transition, if not in the presence of
network effects generally. This suggests both a greater and a more limited
function for law in market transition than previously acknowledged,
highlighting the potential need for a public impetus in securities market
transition, but also emphasizing the appropriately constrained scope of any
such intervention.
Contrary to the traditional assumption that markets will spontaneously
emerge, and the recent assertion that law's protection of minority investors
is the law that matters in transition, this Article suggests that law has a
critical role to play in overcoming network effect obstacles to efficient
transition. By helping to coordinate market expectations, law may thus
344. This Article thus joins the growing number of analyses that have found Russia and other
transitional states to be useful laboratories for the study of economic and legal transition generally. See,
e.g., Coffee, supra note 204, at 25-37; Fox & Heller, supra note 26, at 1720. Michael A. Heller, The
Tragedy of the Anticommons: Propertyin the Transitionfrom Marx to Markets, Il1 HARV. L. REV. 621
(1998). See also AHDIEH, supra note 10, at 2 (highlighting lessons of Russia's constitutional transition

for United States); Edward Glaeser, Simon Johnson & Andrei Shleifer, Coase Versus the Coasians, 116
Q.J. EcON. 853, 855 (2001) (drawing on experience of Czech Republic and Poland to evaluate the
appropriate regulatory role of government).
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facilitate the long-delayed emergence of strong securities markets in
Central and Eastern Europe, and ensure the continued modernization of
markets in the United States and across the globe.

